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ABSURD RESULTS, SCRIVENER'S ERRORS,
AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Andrew S. Gold*
INTRODUCTION
When a sheriff arrests a postal employee for murder, does the arrest
violate a law against obstructing the passage of the mail?' Or, suppose
that a statute makes it illegal to "draw blood" in the streets. Do its terms
apply to a doctor who performs emergency surgery in the street?2 What
of a prisoner who breaks out of prison because the building is on fire?
Does his flight violate a law against prison escapes? 3 Many would say
that these laws should not be taken literally.
In order to avoid odd results, however, courts sometimes have to
rewrite a statute's words. For example, the Ninth Circuit recently
concluded, while interpreting the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, that
the word "less" actually means "more. ' 4 Other courts have found that
the word "of' means "or,"5 and the word "unlawful" means "lawful."6
Should judges ever have the power to revise unambiguous statutes?
Textualists generally say no to this question, and yet they recognize
* Assitant Professor, DePaul University College of Law. I am grateful to Stephen Siegel,
David Franklin, Matthew Sag, Rodney Blackman, Glen Staszewski, Arthur Gold, and Estella Gold for
helpful suggestions. In addition, I wish to thank Rebecca Droller for her excellent research assistance.
Any errors, scrivener's or otherwise, are my own.
1. Cf United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482 *1868) (concluding that the law does not apply to
such facts).
2. Cf. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES *60 ("[T]he Bolognian law, mentioned by
Puffendorf, which enacted 'that whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost
severity,' was held after long debate not to extend to the surgeon, who opened the vein of a person who
fell down in the street with a fit.").
3. Cf. Kirby, 74 U.S. at 487 ("The same common sense accepts the ruling, cited by Plowden,
that the statute of I st Edward II, which enacts that a prisoner who breaks prison shall be guilty of felony,
does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when the prison is on fire-'for he is not to be hanged
because he would not stay to be burnt."').
4. See, e.g., Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 435 F.3d
1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit is not alone in this view. See Pritchett v. Office Depot,
Inc., 420 F.3d 1090, 1093 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005) (concluding that "less" should be read to say "more.").
For a critique of the Ninth Circuit's decision, see Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw
Transit Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2006) (Bybee, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en bane) (suggesting that the court had "ignored the deference we must give to the supremacy of the
legislature").
5. See, e.g., Stanton v. Frankel Bros. Realty Co., 158 N.E. 868, 870 (Ohio 1927).
6. See, e.g., Scurto v. Le Blanc, 184 So. 567, 574 (La. 1938)
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exceptions. These exceptions, and their reconciliation with textualism,
are the topic of this article.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. famously said that, "[w]e do not inquire
what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means."7 This
is an apt summary for textualist statutory interpretation. 8  In essence,
textualist courts look for the meaning of a statutory text, read in context,
as it would be interpreted by a competent user of the language.9 If the
statute is unambiguous, searching behind the statutory language for the
actual intentions of legislators is unnecessary. 10  The court's
determination of the objective meaning of the statute ends the inquiry.
Despite textualist claims that legislative intent is not relevant, this
interpretive approach seems to have limits." When the literal meaning
of a statute would be absurd, courts will seek an alternative reading of
the statutory text. 12  This avoidance of absurd results is known as the
7. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419
(1899).
8. Cf Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 16
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (questioning the view that "the judge's objective in interpreting a statute is to
give effect to 'the intent of the legislature."'); id. at 17 ("It is the law that governs, not the intent of the
lawgiver."); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 59, 60 (1988) ("The words of the statute, and not the intent of the drafters, are the
'law."').
9. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 420
("[Tlextualism does not admit of a simple definition, but in practice is associated with the basic
proposition that judges must seek and abide by the public meaning of the exacted text, understood in
context (as all texts must be)."); Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 65 ("We should look at the statutory
structure and hear the words as they would sound in the mind of a skilled, objectively reasonable user of
words."). See also Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 405 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We are to read
the words of that text as any ordinary Member of Congress would have read them, and apply the
meaning so determined.") (citation omitted).
10. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 8, at 16 (endorsing the rule that "when the text of a statute is
clear, that is the end of the matter."). See also Nat'l Tax Credit Partners, L.P. v. Havlik, 20 F.3d 705,
707 (7th Cir. 1994) (Easterbrook, J.) ("Knowing the purpose behind a rule may help a court decode an
ambiguous text, but first there must be some ambiguity. Subject to the standard proviso about absurd
results, when the statute itself resolves the problem at hand, that is an end to matters.") (citations
omitted).
11. To some commentators, these exceptions indicate that textualism is concerned with
subjective intent. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, "Is That English You're Speaking? "
Why Intention Free Interpretation Is An Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967 (2004) (alleging
exceptions to textualist premises, and concluding "these exceptions all point in one direction-toward a
healthy (but underappreciated) concern for authorial intent."). Cf Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism, 91
VA. L. REV. 347, 348 (2005) ("[J]udges whom we think of as textualists construct their sense of
objective meaning from what the evidence that they are willing to consider tells them about the
subjective intent of the enacting legislature.").
12. For a thorough analysis of this doctrine, see generally John F. Manning, The Absurdity
Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2003). See also Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits
of Literalism: Defining the Absurd Result Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 127
(1994); Jonathan R. Siegel, What Statutory Drafting Errors Teach Us About Statutory Interpretation, 69
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absurdity doctrine. Similarly, when a statute obviously suffers from a
drafting error, courts will correct the statute to comport with the text
Congress presumably intended to write. 13  This exception is the
scrivener's error doctrine.
Avowed textualists willingly apply these exceptions when
interpreting statutes. 14  Yet both of these doctrines are troubling for a
textualist theory of statutory interpretation. In each instance, courts are
given leeway to depart from the literal meaning of the text, based on
what the legislature presumably intended (or would have intended, had
they thought of the specific problem at issue). These judicially created
exceptions appear to create a contradiction between textualist theory and
practice. 15
Furthermore, the absurdity and scrivener's error doctrines raise
difficult line drawing questions. If the absurdity doctrine is grounded in
policy, why should courts limit themselves solely to absurdities, without
addressing the policy concerns that arise in less egregious situations?
16
If the scrivener's error doctrine is grounded in the pursuit of legislative
intent, why not depart from clear statutory language in other cases where
legislative goals and the actual text diverge?' 7 A dividing line between
cases where policy or intent should matter, and cases where a clear text
should prevail, is less than obvious.
Critics argue that the absurdity and scrivener's error doctrines are
fatal to a textualist theory of statutory interpretation. 18  As one
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 309 (2001); John Copeland Nagle, Textualism's Exceptions, in ISSUES IN LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP (2002), available at http://www. Bepress.com/ils/iss3/art 15.
13. See generally Michael S. Fried, A Theory of Scrivener's Error, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 589
(2000) (describing application of the scrivener's error doctrine). See also Siegel, supra note 12; Nagle,
supra note 12.
14. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-28 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (interpreting Rule 609(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence to avoid an "absurd, and perhaps
unconstitutional, result"). See also Manning, supra note 12, at 2420 n.123 (listing opinions by Justice
Scalia and Judge Easterbrook that recognize the absurdity doctrine).
15. See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 12, at 3 (contending that the absurdity and scrivener's error
doctrines conflict with textualist principles).
16. Cf WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 45 (1994)
(suggesting, based on textualist acceptance of the absurdity doctrine, a concession that "following
statutory text is not all that is going on in statutory interpretation, and that current interpretive values
also have a role to play.").
17. Cf Siegel, supra note 12, at 333 ("[l]f the statutory text is the law, why is it sometimes not
the law? Why does it cease to be the law when it is absurd, or obviously mistaken?").
18. See id. ("The more important problem is that acknowledgement of the absurd results or
'scrivener's error' exception undermines the very foundations of textualism."). See also Recent Case,
Statutory Construction-Drafting Errors-D.C. Circuit Declares Section 92 of the National Bank Act
Invalid-Independent Ins. Agents v. Clarke, 955 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1992), 105 HARv. L. REV. 2116,
2121 (1992) ("Rigidly textualist judges ... cannot correct drafting errors without undermining their own
interpretive methodology."). See also Gene Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001, 1065
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commentator recently suggested:
Once it is admitted that statutory text does not always, by virtue of its
creation through constitutional processes, have an unshakable claim to
enforcement, and once it is confirmed that the judiciary may, without
improperly invading the legislative power, depart in some cases from
statutory text, the thing becomes a matter of degree.' 9
Defenders of textualism have also expressed doubts that this kind of
exception is consistent with textualist principles.20 John Manning, for
example, has recently suggested that courts should reject the absurdity
doctrine because it permits courts to displace the outcomes of the
legislative process.
21
In contrast, this article will contend that the absurdity and scrivener's
error doctrines are consistent with textualist principles, at least in cases
of gross absurdities, or obvious drafting errors. In such cases, a literalist
statutory interpretation may be incompatible with the understanding of a
competent user of the language. Competent readers do consider the
apparent intent of an author when they read a document. Because some
interpretations of a statute could not have been intended by the statute's
authors, they are not plausibly consistent with the statute's objective
meaning.
The key to making sense of the alleged exceptions to textualism is to
clarify the role of intent for textualist thought. Statutes are unlike casual
conversations, in which the speaker's subjective intent is paramount to
(2006) (suggesting that John Manning "essentially incorporates both the theory and practice of the
absurdity doctrine into his own version of contextual textualism," and that this approach "casts further
doubt on the theoretical foundations of the new textualism").
19. See Siegel, supra note 12, at 326. For similar arguments, see ESKRIDGE, supra note 16, at
45-46 ("[T]here is no logical reason not to sacrifice plain meaning when it directs an 'unreasonable'
result that was probably unintended by Congress."); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L.
REv. 953, 986 (1995) (suggesting, with respect to an absurdity exception to rules: "once it is decided
that a single exception will be allowed, it is always open, in principle, to decide that another exception
should be made too. The refusal to make a further exception is based on a form of casuistry, finding the
proposed further exception to be distinguishable from the previous case in which an exception has been
made. Hence the line between case-by-case judgments and rule-following becomes thin in principle.").
Cf Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 65 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("In recent
years the Court has suggested that we should only look at legislative history for the purpose of resolving
textual ambiguities or to avoid absurdities. It would be wiser to acknowledge that it is always
appropriate to consider all available evidence of Congress' true intent when interpreting its work
product.").
20. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1,
115 (2001) (suggesting textualists' adherence to absurdity doctrine "subjects [them] to the charge that
there is no principled difference between their (narrow) absurdity doctrine and more robust forms of
strong purposivism or equitable interpretation."); Nagle, supra note 12, at 2 ("[W]hy have an exception
in the first place? If statutory text is paramount, then why should the results matter?").
21. See Manning, supra note 12, at 2486.
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interpreting the meaning of an utterance. 22 The nature of the legislative
process raises serious doubts about the verifiability, and even existence,
of a subjective legislative intent raise serious doubts. But even if no true
intent exists, statutes can still appear to be the product of an authorial
intent.
This presumed, "objectified" intent is a standard feature of textualist
doctrine. 23 Textualists regularly rely on such presumptions-Congress's
presumed intent enables courts to adopt colloquial word meanings in
place of dictionary definitions, for example.24 Courts also assume that
established terms of art are intended to have their acquired meaning.
25
Linguistic conventions permit judges to conclude that an intended
meaning exists without knowing what was actually intended.
Although the situations are unusual, both the absurdity and
scrivener's error doctrines fit within this broad concept of an
"objectified" intent. They address an outcome which is so unthinkable,
or a word choice which is so clearly mistaken, that a literal interpretation
of the statute's words would deviate from the conventional
understanding of the statutory language. It is not plausible to presume
Congress desires that its words be read to the letter under these
circumstances. To the extent objective meaning is a guide, even a court
that is skeptical that legislative intent exists can rule out certain statutory
interpretations.
Recognizing why textualism permits the absurdity and scrivener's
error doctrines does more than provide coherence, however. A textualist
justification for these doctrines also places limits on their scope.26 Only
extreme cases---cases of obviousness-would justify reliance on an
22. Id. at 2462 n.274 (drawing this distinction).
23. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 8, at 17 ("We look for a sort of 'objectified' intent-the intent
that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the
corpus juris."). See also Manning, supra note 9, at 426 n.23 ("[T]extualists believe that objective intent
derives from the way a person conversant with applicable social and linguistic conventions would read
the words in context.").
24. See Manning, supra note 20, at 109 ("Like any reasonable language user, textualists pay
attention to the glosses often put on language (even in ordinary usage), the specialized connotations of
established terms of art, and the background conventions that sometimes tell readers how to fill in the
gaps inevitably left in statutory directions.").
25. See Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) ("[W]here Congress borrows terms
of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably
knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning
from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise
instructed.").
26. Cf Pub. Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 471 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that the absurdity doctrine is only a legitimate tool "where it is quite impossible
that Congress could have intended the result, and where the alleged absurdity is so clear as to be obvious
to most anyone.") (citation omitted).
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"objectified" intent that conflicts with an otherwise clear statute. Less
severe departures from anticipated uses of language may reflect the
compromises inherent in the legislative process.27 This line between
obvious and debatable cases is not bright, but it is necessary if courts are
to concern themselves solely with what a statute objectively means.
Part I of this article will describe the basic premises of textualist
thought. Part II will outline the primary arguments offered in support of
the textualist approach. One of the principal justifications is a
skepticism regarding the verifiability, and in some cases the possibility,
of legislative intent. Other concerns include the formal nature of
legislation, and the constitutional separation of powers. These concerns
provide a backdrop for the discussion which follows.
Part III will set forth the two significant "exceptions" to textualism,
the absurdity doctrine and the scrivener's error doctrine. Although some
dispute exists as to the proper scope of these doctrines, this discussion
will provide an analysis of each as applied by courts. This Section will
also discuss the textualist challenges raised by both doctrines.
Parts IV and V will demonstrate that the scrivener's error and
absurdity doctrines can be squared with textualist thinking, given a
context-based analysis of legislative language. A reasonable reader of
statutory language takes into account the apparent intent of an author as
evidenced by the text. These Sections of the article will suggest that,
when a drafting error is obvious enough, or an application of statutory
language sufficiently absurd, a reasonable reader would understand the
meaning of a statute to exclude the "literal" meaning. As a result, the
objective meaning of a statute is distinct from its literalist interpretation.
Finally, Part VI will address the line drawing difficulties posed by a
test for absurdities and scrivener's errors that covers only the most
egregious cases. Courts may misapply either doctrine, and in some
cases will have incentives to do so. A requirement that all readers would
agree Congress could not have intended the statute to apply to the matter
in dispute, or that the statutory language could not have been intended as
written, should limit the potential for misuse.
I. TEXTUALISM DEFINED
Broadly defined, textualism is a theory of statutory interpretation that
calls for judges to enforce the objective meaning of statutory language.28
27. Cf Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 461 (2002) ("Dissatisfied with the text
of the statute, the Commissioner attempts to search for and apply an overarching legislative purpose to
each section of the statute. Dissatisfaction, however, is often the cost of legislative compromise.").
28. But cf Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct.. 2611, 2628 (2005) (Stevens,
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Assuming that a statute's meaning is unambiguous, courts must
faithfully apply the text as written.29 This objective meaning is located
in the reader's understanding of the text. In this formulation, the
statute's meaning can be found in "the understanding of the objectively
reasonable person. 3° Courts should hear the words of a statute as a
"skilled, objectively reasonable user of words" would hear them.3'
Textualists also recognize that the meaning of words is context-
dependent.32  In contrast with early plain-meaning theories, modem
proponents reject a context-free understanding of language, whereby
J., dissenting) ("Because ambiguity is apparently in the eye of the beholder, I remain convinced that it is
unwise to treat the ambiguity vel non of a statute as determinative of whether legislative history is
consulted."). It is beyond the scope of this article to assess the possibility of an objective meaning. On
the question of whether an objective meaning exists, see Kent Greenawalt, How Law Can Be
Determinate, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1, 85 (concluding that many legal questions have determinate answers
"in the sense of answers (1) that virtually all lawyers would reach upon understanding the legal
questions and (2) that are unopposed by any powerful contrary arguments consonant with the 'ground
rules' of the legal enterprise."); Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and
Authority, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 203, 222 (Andrei Marmor ed.,
1995) ("Meaning is not radically indeterminate; instead, meaning is public-fixed by public behaviour,
beliefs, and understandings. There is no reason to assume that such conventions cannot fix the meaning
of terms determinately."). See also Manning, supra note 12, at 2397 n.30 (citing literature on this
question).
29. See Scalia, supra note 8, at 16 ("when the text of a statute is clear, that is the end of the
matter."). See also Manning, supra note 9, at 420 ("[Tlextualism does not admit of a simple definition,
but in practice is associated with the basic proposition that judges must seek and abide by the public
meaning of the enacted text, understood in context (as all texts must be).").
30. Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 65. See also id. at 61 ("Meaning comes from the ring the words
would have had to a skilled user of words at the time, thinking about the same problem."). This is not to
say that all judges will agree on the perspective of an objectively reasonable person. Cf Kent
Greenawalt, Are Mental States Relevant for Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation?, 85 CORNELL
L. REV. 1609, 1658 (2000) ("Mental state perplexities may intrude when typical readers, or a reasonable
reader, determine legislative purpose and when the judge decides how to construct the reader.").
3 1. Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 65. See also Scalia, supra note 8, at 17 (suggesting judges look
for "the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the
remainder of the corpusjuris.").
32. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 61 (1994) ("Words take their meaning from contexts, of which there are
many-other words, social and linguistic conventions, the problems the authors were addressing."). See
also Manning, supra note 12, at 2457 ("[T]extualists do believe that statutes convey meaning only
because members of a relevant linguistic community apply shared background conventions for
understanding how particular words are used in particular contexts."). For dramatic examples of the
effect which context may have on word meaning, see Gerald Graff, 'Keep offthe Grass,' 'Drop Dead,'
and Other Indeterminacies: A Response to Sanford Levinson, 60 TEX. L. REV. 405, 407-08 (1982). In
addition to the statutory setting, textualists recognize the significance of choosing the relevant linguistic
community when interpreting a document. See, e.g., Cont'l Can Co. v. Chi. Truck Drivers, 916 F.2d
1154, 1157 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.) ("You don't have to be Ludwig Wittgenstein or Hans-
Georg Gadamer to know that successful communication depends on meanings shared by interpretive
communities."). See also Manning, supra note 12, at 2396 ("[C]ontemporary theories of textual
interpretation... build on Wittgenstein's premise that language is intelligible by virtue of a
community's shared conventions for understanding words in context.").
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courts look solely to the four comers of a document for its meaning. 33
Nor are dictionary definitions always decisive when determining the
meanings of words, although they provide relevant evidence of that
34meaning. Words may have established definitions in colloquial usage
that differ from their dictionary definitions.35
Modem textualists contend that statutory language must be read in
light of the reasonable understanding of the relevant linguistic
community, given the circumstances in which the language was
uttered.36  The setting matters. Thus, a technical term may be
understood in light of the definition used by experts in the field, or a
legal term of art may be read with respect to its common law meaning.
Ambiguities are often resolved by the common understanding of a word
in a particular context.
This philosophy is frequently contrasted with an interpretive stance
known as intentionalism. Intentionalists are concerned with the
subjective intent of the legislature in enacting a statute, and this is where
they locate statutory meaning.37  To be sure, the border between
textualism and intentionalism is not always obvious. 38  By and large,
33. This is a point which John Manning has emphasized. See Manning, supra note 12, at 2456
(explaining that this plain-meaning school has been rejected by modem textualists). Leading textualists
are quite clear that they do not consider themselves to be literalists. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 9, at
434 (noting that textualists are not literalists); Manning, supra note 20, at 108 (same); Scalia, supra note
8, at 24 ("The good textualist is not a literalist .... "); Easterbrook, supra note 32, at 67 ("I want to
reemphasize what should be obvious. 'Plain meaning' as a way to understand language is silly.").
34. See Easterbrook, supra note 32, at 67 (noting that "the choice among meanings must have a
footing more solid [than] a dictionary-which is a museum of words, an historical catalog rather than a
means to decode the work of legislatures."); Manning, supra note 12, at 2458-59 ("[B]ecause
dictionaries have a limited capacity to record the nuances of usage, widely shared contextual
understandings may identify colloquial refinements of even the most locally applicable dictionary
definitions.").
35. See Manning, supra note 12, at 2459. (providing as an example the manner in which the term
"motor vehicle" has come to mean "cars, trucks, and perhaps motorcycles.").
36. See id. at 2458 ("Modem textualists start from the premises that 'a large number of
contextual understandings will be assumed by all speakers of a language,' and that many such
understandings will be 'largely invariant across English speakers at a given time."') (quoting FREDERICK
F. SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-
MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 57 & n.6 (1991)). See also Easterbrook, supra note 32, at 61. For
examples ofjudicial expressions of this point, see Manning, supra note 20, at 11 n.433.
37. As William Eskridge defines the traditional intentionalist approach, "the Court views its role
as implementing the original intent or purpose of the enacting Congress." William N. Eskridge, Jr., The
New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 626 (1990). From the intentionalist perspective, "almost
anything that casts light upon what Congress attempted to do when it enacted a statute is potentially
relevant." Id. Textualists, in contrast, are far less willing to consider evidence of legislative intent.
38. See Nelson, supra note 11, at 353-54 (noting that "textualist as well as intentionalist judges
routinely seek to identify and enforce the legal directives that an appropriately informed interpreter
would conclude the enacting legislature had meant to establish."). See also id. at 359-60 (providing
examples). See also Caleb Nelson, A Response to Professor Manning, 91 VA. L. REV. 451, 464 (2005)
[hereinafter Nelson, A Response] (arguing that distinctions between intentionalists and textualists are not
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however, intentionalists are interested in the meaning a statute actually
had to its authors, while textualists are interested in the meaning it
would have to a competent reader.
39
Efforts to discern what a reasonable reader would understand a text to
mean often take into account the apparent intent of the text's author.40 A
reasonable reader understands language in light of how authors under
the circumstances usually intend their words.41  Thus, textualist courts
look for an "objectified intent., 42  Should an author's actual intent
diverge from the apparent intent indicated by the text, the textualist will
conclude that the apparent intent prevails.
43
Intent may play a different role where ambiguities arise. Ambiguous
statutes have more than one plausible meaning, and they require more
from a court than a mere application of a statute's objective meaning. 44
Some textualist judges are willing to consider legislative history where a
statutory text is ambiguous.45 Whether this choice to review legislative
history concedes an interest in subjective legislative intent is a separate
question.46 For that matter, whether a statute is ambiguous in the first
clear cut).
39. See Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Tools, Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature of Statutory
Interpretation, 30 J. LEGIS. 1, 20 (2003) (suggesting "textualism ... employs a reader-centered strategy"
and "[i]ntentionalism ... employs a writer-centered strategy for attributing meaning to statutory text.").
The two conceptions can be collapsed to some extent. Cf Greenawalt, supra note 30, at 1672
(concluding that "[r]eaders of statutes end up making judgments about the aims of legislators.").
40. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 8, at 17 ("We look for a sort of 'objectified' intent-the intent
that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the
corpus juris."). See also id. ("As Bishop's old treatise nicely put it.. . '[T]he primary object of all rules
for interpreting statutes is to ascertain the legislative intent; or, exactly, the meaning which the subject is
authorized to understand the legislature intended."') (emphasis omitted) (citing JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP,
COMMENTARIES ON THE WRITTEN LAWS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION 57-58 (1882)).
41. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 405 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We are to
read the words of that text as any ordinary Member of Congress would have read them, and apply the
meaning so determined.") (citation omitted). Note that this reference to how an ordinary Member of
Congress would read words is not a reference to how that individual did read the words.
42. See Scalia, supra note 8, at 17.
43. As Jonathan Siegel notes, there is some uncertainty whether the Supreme Court considers
this a question of the clarity of Congress's intent, or the clarity of the text itself. See Siegel, supra note
12, at 325 n.74 (discussing cases which use either formulation).
44. Cf Alexander & Prakash, supra note 11, at 988 (suggesting that, without reference to
evidence of actual authorial intent, a text may have multiple objective meanings).
45. See, e.g., Bd. of Trade v. SEC, 187 F.3d 713, 720 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J.)
("Legislative history is problematic under the best circumstances, and even so reliable a source as the
Conference Committee Report may be used only when there is a genuine ambiguity in the statute.").
See also Nelson, supra note 11, at 360 n.38 (citing statements by Judge Easterbrook which recognize the
potential usefulness of legislative history in interpreting ambiguous statutes); John F. Manning,
Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 673, 737 n.272 (1997) (providing
examples of cases in which textualist judges consider a statute's drafting evolution as part of statutory
context).
46. Cf Nelson, supra note 11, at 360-61 ("[T]extualists as well as intentionalists make use of
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place can be difficult to resolve.47
For purposes of this article, however, the problems of ambiguity are
not at issue. When statutes are unambiguous, courts are faced with a
different concern. Under the traditional understanding of textualism, an
unambiguous statute is decisive, and Congress's subjective legislative
intent is unavailable as a source of statutory meaning.48 It is in this
context that the absurdity and scrivener's error doctrines become
significant.
II. THE CONCEPTUAL AND POLICY FOUNDATIONS OF TEXTUALISM
As later Sections of this Article will develop, textualism is
inconsistent with some incarnations of the absurdity and scrivener's
error doctrines. It is (or can be) compatible with a narrow reading of
these doctrines, but the ability to reconcile textualism and its
"exceptions" depends on the premises of textualist thinking. Common
justifications for textualism, along with their implications, are set forth
in the discussion below.
A. Intent Skepticism
Textualists are deeply skeptical that courts can accurately verify
legislative purposes beyond what is indicated by express statutory
language. Two of the leading judicial proponents of textualism, Justice
Scalia and Judge Easterbrook, both emphasize this concern. Insights
from public choice theory play a prominent role in this skepticism.
Proponents raise doubts about the existence of intent as applied to
groups. In addition, some question the judicial capacity to reconstruct
legislative intent after the fact, even assuming that a group intent exists.
Public choice theory suggests that legislation is often the product of
interest groups' competing for legislative outcomes. 49  Statutory
publicly available information about the linguistic habits and policy preferences of the particular group
of legislators who comprised the enacting Congress."), with Manning, supra note 9, at 439 n.65
("[T]extualists may rely on apparent overall purpose not as a way of identifying subjective legislative
intent, but rather as a theory of appropriate judicial behavior in cases of indeterminacy."). See also
Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 441, 443 (1990)
("Because laws themselves do not have purposes or spirits-only the authors are sentient-it may be
essential to mine the context of the utterance out of the debates, just as we learn the limits of a holding
from reading the entire opinion.").
47. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct.. 2611, 2628 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that ambiguity is "in the eye of the beholder").
48. See supra note 10.
49. See Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 63 ("[T]he original intent approach to legislation ignores
the fact that laws are born of compromise. Different designs pull in different directions. To use an
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language is frequently drafted through a complex bargaining process,
which can result in legislative compromises that do not reflect shared
policy goals.50 Theorists such as Kenneth Arrow have demonstrated that
legislation may reflect multiple preferences, with the order in which
votes are taken altering the substantive outcome of the bargaining
process.
51
Assuming a shared policy goal, the legislature may have chosen an
incremental means to achieve it.5 2  Purpose-based interpretation raises
the concern that a deviation from the letter of the law will conflict with
the chosen means, effectively disregarding legislators' actual
intentions.53 In light of the potential for legislative compromise, judges
are not well situated to determine how legislators intended to resolve
particular problems other than by compliance with a clear. statutory
algebraic metaphor, law is like a vector. It has length as well as direction."). See also Manning, supra
note 20, at 18 ("Because statutory details may reflect only what competing groups could agree upon,
legislation cannot be expected to pursue its purposes to their logical ends; accordingly, departing from a
precise statutory text may do no more than disturb a carefully wrought legislative compromise.").
50. In Judge Easterbrook's words:
If legislation grows out of compromises among special interests, however, a court cannot
add enforcement to get more of what Congress wanted. What Congress wanted was the
compromise, not the objectives of the contending interests. The statute has no purpose.
It is designed to do what it does in fact. The stopping points are as important as the other
provisions.
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 46 (1984):
5 1. See Kenneth Shepsle, Congress Is a "They, " Not an "It ": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron,
12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 241-44 (1992) (explaining how, under Arrow's Theorem, "it is not
possible to guarantee that a majority rule process will yield coherent choices"). See also Frank H.
Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, 50 U. CHi. L. REV. 533, 547-48 (1983) ("It is fairly easy to show that
someone with control of the agenda can manipulate the choice so that the legislature adopts proposals
that only a minority support. The existence of agenda control makes it impossible for a court--even one
that knows each legislator's complete table of preferences-to say what the whole body would have
done with a proposal it did not consider in fact.") (citation omitted). In addition, "[a] successful
logrolling process yields unanimity on every recorded vote and indeterminacy on all issues for which
there is no recorded vote." See id. at 548 (citation omitted). For additional commentary, see Manning,
supra note 20, at 19 n.76 (gathering sources).
52. Cf Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 404 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[l]t is not
senseless to bar a Canadian antitrust offender from possessing a gun in this country, while exempting a
domestic antitrust offender from the ban. Congress might have decided to proceed incrementally and
exempt only antitrust offenses with which it was familiar, namely, domestic ones.").
53. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 n.4 (1994) (Scalia, J.)
(noting that the Court is "bound, not only by the ultimate purposes Congress has selected, but by the
means it has deemed appropriate, and prescribed, for the pursuit of those purposes."). See also
Manning, supra note 20, at 19 ("[T]extualists contend that enforcing the purpose, rather than the letter,
of the law may defeat the legislature's basic decision to use rules rather than standards to articulate its
objectives."); Easterbrook, supra note 32, at 68 ("Sometimes Congress specifies values or ends, things
for the executive and judicial branches to achieve, but often it specifies means, creating loopholes but
greater certainty. Using legislative history and an imputed 'spirit' to convert one approach into another
dishonors the legislative choice as effectively as expressly refusing to follow the law.").
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54
In many cases, no legislative intent exists with respect to specific
statutory clauses. A bill may not be fully read in all its particulars by
each legislator.55 And a group cannot possess intentions in the same
manner as an individual speaker.56 Groups do not have minds. Even if
one posits that legislatures can possess a majoritarian "group intent" by
amalgamating the intent of individual legislators, the legislative majority
is often comprised of individuals with multiple, divergent intentions.57
54. As Manning explains:
The question is not about legislative or societal preferences in the abstract. Rather, the
relevant question is whether the legislature-constrained by the legislative process-
would have been able to agree on wording that would include or exclude the troubling
application or omission. Modem textualists contend that the latter question is simply
unanswerable after the fact. The legislative process, they argue, is too complex, too path-
dependent, and too opaque to allow judges to reconstruct whether Congress would have
resolved any particular question differently from the way the clear statutory text resolves
the question.
Manning, supra note 12, at 2409-10.
55. This point applies afortiori to legislative history. Cf Bank One Chi. N.A. v. Midwest Bank
& Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 279 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that "it is a fiction of Jack-
and-the-Beanstalk proportions to assume that more than a handful of those Senators and Members of the
House who voted for the final version of the Expedited Funds Availability Act, and the President who
signed it, were, when they took those actions, aware of the drafting evolution that the Court describes."),
56. See Heidi M. Hurd, Sovereignty In Silence, 99 YALE L.J. 945, 969 (1990) (describing the
implausibility of the position that "legislatures experience sensations, moods, and emotions, as well as
intentions."). See also Easterbrook, supra note 32, at 68 ("Intent is elusive for a natural person, fictive
for a collective body."); Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law. A Skeptical Overview, 148 U.
PA. L. REv. 1363, 1389 (2000) ("[Ljegislatures, courts, agencies, and other legal institutions do not
possess mental states, independent of the mental states of the persons that make up these institutions.").
But see Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws. The Central Role of Legislative Intent in
Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427, 437-444 (2005) (suggesting that a group can be seen as
possessing a single intent even if its constituent individuals do not share the same reasons for their
intent). Although Solan accurately describes how we sometimes think of groups in intentional terms, it
does not follow that our perception of a group's joint intent actually reflects an intention in a literal
sense. As Hurd notes, "individuals within a group would have to function with each other in a manner
analogous to the way in which neurons function together in a brain before such a group could literally be
thought to possess a mental state like an intention." Hurd, supra at 970.
57. See Hurd, supra note 56, at 973 ("Just because each member of a group intends to
communicate something does not mean that the group intends to communicate some one thing."). This
point was forcefully made by Max Radin, in Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 863, 870 (1930)
("That the intention of the legislature is undiscoverable in any real sense is almost an immediate
inference from a statement of the proposition. The chances that of several hundred [legislators] each
will have exactly the same determinate situations in mind.. . are infinitesimally small."). See also
Easterbrook, supra note 51, at 547 (suggesting legislatures do not have intents, only "outcomes"). Cf
Greenawalt, supra note 30, at 1627 ("One can undoubtedly speak of group intentions when all, or
virtually all, members of the group have the same specific intention, the intention is relevant to their
participation together, and the members know that the intention is shared. Whether one should speak of
the intentions of a group in other circumstances is more doubtful."). For an interesting analysis of cases
in which there is no majority preference within a group, see Einer Elhauge, Preference Eliciting Default
Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2076-78 (2002).
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If courts were able to accurately verify the intention of each individual
comprising a legislative majority, there still might be no group intent for
the interpreter to verify.
It is also debatable whether one can accurately verify legislative intent
after the fact. As time passes, the reconstruction of intent grows
increasingly difficult, if not impossible. 58 The historicist concern is that
the court's interpretation "will inevitably be influenced by current
context, including the interpreter's own views and predispositions. 59
Especially in cases of older statutes, the challenges can be
insurmountable.
60
In response to the problem of unknowable (or unverifiable) intentions,
the textualist therefore looks to the legislators' intent to enact the
statutory text itself.6' Joseph Raz notes that the intention required to
legislate is "the intention to say what one would be normally understood
as saying, given the circumstances in which one said it."62 This abstract
intention is sufficient to justify following an enacted law as written, even
in cases where individual legislators lack an understanding of the
content of the legislation.63
The intent that a given text become law is an intention which courts
can presume each legislator in the majority shares. 64 For textualists, this
is enough. As Manning explains the textualist insight: "If one cannot
accurately ascertain what the body as a whole would have done with
matters unspecified or even misspecified by the text, then perhaps the
best one can do is to approximate the way a reasonable person in the
58. See Easterbrook, supra note 51, at 550 ("It is all very well to say that a judge able to
understand the temper of 1871 (and 1921), and able to learn the extent of a compromise in 1936, may do
well when construing statutes. How many judges meet this description?").
59. Eskridge, supra note 37, at 644.
60. Cf id. at 646 ("The current judicial interpreter cannot ignore important legal developments
after 1866 (such as the adoption of the fourteenth amendment in 1868 and the enactment of the 1871
Act) and, more subtly, cannot expunge personal feelings about the variety of remedies that should be
available to enforce our nation's civil rights laws today.").
61. Manning, supra note 9, at 433. See also Jeremy Waldron, Legislators' Intentions and
Unintentional Legislation, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 329, 355
(Andrei Marmor ed., 1995) ("[I]t strikes me that in a multi-cultural society, legislators are entitled to
insist on the authoritativeness of the text and nothing but the text, as the only thing that one can be sure
has been at the forefront of each member's legislative endeavors.").
62. Joseph Raz, Intention in Interpretation, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL
POSITIvISM 249, 268 (Robert P. George ed., 1996).
63. See id. at 267 (describing the minimal required intent for an act to qualify as legislative, and
noting that "[o]n this understanding the required intention is very minimal, and does not include any
understanding of the content of the legislation.").
64. Cf Manning, supra note 9, at 433 ("Ascribing... objectified intent to legislators offers an
intelligible way for textualists to hold them accountable for whatever law they have passed, whether or
not they have any actual intent, singly or collectively, respecting its details.").
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legislator's position would have read the words actually adopted.,
65
B. Constitutional Structure
In addition to disputing the existence and verifiability of legislative
intent, textualists also raise formal concerns. Notably, they contend that
intentionalism is inconsistent with the judicial role in a system of
separated powers. The intent of individual legislators, or even the
legislature as a whole, is not the same thing as the statute itself.
66
In one formulation, the concern with intentionalism is that the
legislature would be encroaching on the judicial branch. From this
perspective, "[i]ntended meaning is a form of extra-statutory legislative
interpretation of a statute, and judicial reliance upon it allows the
legislature to exercise essentially judicial power."67  Courts are seen as
abdicating their responsibility to interpret the text if they defer to the
manner in which individual legislators interpret it.
Another perspective considers the Constitution's requirements under
the Presentment Clause.68 Arguably, allowing legislators' subjective
intentions to count as law permits members of the legislative branch (or
their staffs) to produce laws that are not voted on by each chamber and
signed by the President.69 Manning has presented a variation on these
arguments, suggesting that reliance on legislative history as authority
allows for a congressional self-delegation. 70  In effect, agents of
Congress, through the legislative history, are permitted to legislate by
65. Id. Cf Greenawalt, supra note 30, at 1634 ("The justification for deciding that the crucial
mental state of legislators is having statutes interpreted according to conventional techniques cannot be
simply that this is a straightforward application to law of what is generally true for personal
communications. The reasons for choosing this mental state must rest on special features of the law.").
66. See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The
greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy. We are governed by laws, not by the intentions
of legislators."). See also id. ("The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the
only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself") (quoting Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 9, 24 (1845)).
67. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY: A RE-EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 34 (1989).
68. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
69. See Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1560 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J., concurring)
("Committee reports that contradict statutory language or purport to explicate the meaning or
applicability of particular statutory provisions can short-circuit the legislative process, leading to results
never approved by Congress or the President."). Another issue relates to the potential that the President
in signing a bill into law will not have considered the legislative history. See Eskridge, supra note 37, at
650 (describing this theory). See also Kenneth Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History,
1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 376 (1987).
70. See Manning, supra note 45, at 710-25.
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this means.]
Not all uses of legislative history are problematic. 72  However, to the
extent that legislative history serves as an authoritative source of
statutory meaning, it can raise separation of powers concerns. The
import of a clear statutory text is that it is, in the view of textualist
courts, the exclusive source of a law's command.
C. Instrumental Effects of Textualism
Also, textualists consider the potential consequences of their
interpretive approach vis a vis intentionalism. Some look to the
incentives that strict interpretation of statutory texts may provide for
Congress in future cases. If courts are unwilling to modify statutes that
are inconsistent with legislative history or broad policy goals, this may
encourage greater clarity in legislative drafting.73 Interest groups may
be motivated to reveal their preferences more openly.74
Another argument suggests that judges do a better job of
approximating legislative intent when they try to determine the
meanings of statutes without reference to legislative history.75 Caleb
Nelson has recently suggested that textualism may be the approach best-
suited to approximating subjective legislative intent. Rather than an end
71. See id. at 698. See also Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264,
280 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("Thus, if legislation consists
of forming an 'intent' rather than adopting a text (a proposition with which I do not agree), Congress
cannot leave the formation of that intent to a small band of its number, but must, as the Constitution
says, form an intent of the Congress.") The problem can also be stated in terms of encroachment on the
judicial power. See Manning, supra note 45, at 706 ("This practice effectively assigns legislative agents
the law elaboration function-the power 'to say what the law is."').
72. On appropriate uses of legislative history, compare Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of
Legislative History in a System of Separated Powers, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1457 (2000), with John F.
Manning, Putting Legislative History to a Vote: A Response to Professor Siegel, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1529
(2000).
73. See Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 103 (2000) ("A central
argument for textualism is that it has a democracy-forcing effect: Judicial refusal to remake enacted text
forces Congress to legislate more responsibly ex ante."). As Vermeule indicates, this argument raises
empirical questions.
74. See id. at 103-04 ("The argument can also be put in the language of information-eliciting
default rules: Adherence to text will prod legislative coalitions into revealing their preferences
explicitly.").
75. Cf Nelson, supra note 11, at 363 ("People who want judges to enforce the intended meaning
of statutes ... must try to decide which sort of case is more common: in the aggregate, will judges reach
more accurate assessments of intended meaning if they try to gauge the reliability of legislative history
on a case-by-case basis or if they apply a more categorical presumption against its usefulness?"). See
also Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of
Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1863-77 (1998) (discussing how distinctive features of
legislative history may interact with judicial constraints "in ways that produce distinctively severe risks
of judicial error in the determination of legislative intent.")
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in itself, some textualists may see their interpretive method "as the best
means of generating matches between the legal directives that courts
enforce and Congress's actual collective understandings of the statutes it
enacts. ,76
Finally, a prominent strand of textualism considers the potential for
judicial bias. Legislative history often contains remarks supporting both
sides of an issue. Judge Leventhal famously said that reviewing
legislative history is like "looking over a crowd and picking out your
friends. 77 In theory, textualist interpretation would constrain the ability
of judges to advance their personal policy preferences through a
selective use of legislative history.
Whether or not these instrumental arguments for textualism are
empirically supported is unclear. Congress, for example, may inevitably
draft vague or ambiguous legislation due to the impossibility of
predicting all statutory applications, and the practical realities of
legislative compromise.78 Whatever the merits of these claims may be,
instrumental arguments do appear to influence judicial opinions.79
76. Nelson, A Response, supra note 38, at 461.
77. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct.. 2611, 2626 (2005) (quoting Patricia
Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA
L. REV. 195, 214 (1983)). Judge Wald's article recounts a conversation with Judge Leventhal in which
this comment was made.
78. Cf Eskridge, supra note 37, at 677 ("The vast majority of the Court's difficult statutory
interpretation cases involve statutes whose ambiguity is either the result of deliberate legislative choice
to leave conflictual decisions to agencies or the courts, or the result of social or legal developments the
most clairvoyant legislators could not have foreseen."). Eskridge concludes that, "[e]ven if Congress
drafted statutes with a sophisticated appreciation of the Court's ground rules, it is doubtful whether
clearer rules would improve the drafting process." Id. See also Siegel, supra note 12, at 342-43 ("[I]t is
unrealistic to imagine that the hundreds or even thousands of people involved in a statute's passage
could, if only given the right incentives, anticipate everything that will happen once the statute is
actually governing the hundreds of millions of people that make up the country."). For an example of
intentional statutory vagueness, see Matthew Sag, God in the Machine: A New Structural Analysis of
Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, I I MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 381, 434 (2005) (suggesting that
Congress opted for a vague fair use doctrine in order to delegate difficult policy decisions to the courts).
79. For example, Justice Scalia has argued as follows:
It should not be possible, or at least should not be easy, to be sure of obtaining a
particular result in this Court without making that result apparent on the face of the bill
which both Houses consider and vote upon, which the President approves, and which, if
it becomes law, the people must obey. I think we have an obligation to conduct our
exegesis in a fashion which fosters that democratic process.
United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 345-46 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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D. Distinctions Between Textualism and Intentionalism
Several commentators have recently suggested that textualists are
simply a different type of intentionalist. 80  Some suggest that, when
textualists look for an objectified intent, they are making an
intentionalist inquiry. 8 1  Often, this conclusion is supported with the
claim that interpretation requires an inquiry into intent.82  Perhaps
textualists only differ from intentionalists regarding the best
methodology for determining intent.
83
Taking textualist judges at their word, these suggestions are incorrect.
Some ostensibly textualist courts may be concerned with the
legislature's actual intent. But leading proponents have expressly
rejected the intentionalist view. It is this intention-free theory of
textualism-the view which rejects actual intent as a source of
meaning-to which this article will refer in the discussion which
80. See, e.g., Alexander & Prakash, supra note 11, at 982 ("[W]e believe that many textualists,
despite their protestations to the contrary, are ultimately interested in the intentions of actual authors.");
Nelson, supra note 1I, at 353 (2005) ("Textualists and intentionalists alike give every indication of
caring both about the meaning intended by the enacting legislature and about the need for readers to
have fair notice of that meaning, as well as about some additional policy-oriented goals."). Cf Jonathan
T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 3 (2006) ("Given that nonadherents
and adherents of textualism alike place great weight on statutory text and look beyond text to context, it
is hard to tell what remains of the textualism-purposivism debate.").
81. See Alexander & Prakash, supra note 11, at 978-82 (describing alleged textualist exceptions
to an intention-free method of statutory interpretation). See also id. at 975 n.23 ("As we explain later,
we believe that invocations of context amount to unacknowledged invocations of authorial intent.").
82. See id. at 972 ("We shall argue that such [intention free) textualism is a conceptual
impossibility-that authorial intentions constitute the meanings of texts."); Larry Alexander, All or
Nothing at All?, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILoSoPHY 357, 361 (Andrei
Marmor ed., 1995) ("If texts are attempts by their authors to communicate, then texts mean what their
authors intend them to mean."); David Sosa, The Unintentional Fallacy, 86 CAL. L. REv. 919, 927
(1998) ("[T]he rule of law is emphatically not about form. It is 'about' meaning. And meaning cannot
ultimately be independent of intention."). Cf Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The
Central Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427, 471 (2005) ("I don't
believe that any judge or commentator can consistently maintain that courts should dispense altogether
with discussion of legislative intent. The concept is just too deeply embedded in the way we see the
world.").
83. See Nelson, supra note 11, at 376-77 ("As compared to intentionalism... textualism can be
seen as a more rule-based method of ascertaining what the enacting legislature probably meant."). Cf
Alexander & Prakash, supra note 11, at 983 (proposing a possible form of textualism where "the
interpreter should seek out authorial intent, but in doing so should refuse to consider certain kinds of
evidence thereof, even if reliable."). Among other things, the absurdity and scrivener's error doctrines
are urged as support for the view that textualists do care about legislative intent. See id. at 979 ("Those
who seemingly advance an [intention free] textualism use these doctrines to avoid the odd readings that
application of such a textualism would yield. In so doing, these scholars once again back away from
their strong textualism by bringing in authorial intentions through the backdoor."). See also Nelson,
supra note 11, at 356 (suggesting that, even if these doctrines are grounded in an "objective meaning",
the textualist determines that objective meaning "by asking what an appropriately informed reader
would think that the members of the enacting legislature had (subjectively) intended.").
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follows.
84
Textualism so conceived is conceptually different from intentionalism
when defining statutory meaning. The objectified intent recognizable
from a text, taken in context, is not the same as the actual subjective
intent of its authors.85 A legislature's actual intent may or may not track
the apparent intent implied by legislative language, assuming that an
actual intent exists. 86  In the case of a clear statute, the textualist is not
interested in the legislature's actual intent.
As noted above, some reference to an author's apparent intent is a
requirement for interpreting a text in the manner of a reasonable,
competent reader. 87 Users of language-including the competent reader
of a statute-will naturally understand the meaning of an author's words
in light of the author's presumed understanding.88  If readers regularly
divorced the meaning of an utterance from this presumed understanding,
communication is difficult to imagine.
Context-based interpretation of an otherwise ambiguous text is a case
in point. Where multiple meanings of a phrase are available, the
conventional meaning may be clear based on what is usually intended in
that context.89 Context also sometimes indicates a meaning of a word
that differs from its common meaning, to the extent the unusual usage
fits the circumstances. 90 The appearance of intent, based on convention,
is relevant for textualist interpretation. 91
To avoid the pitfalls of literalism, and perhaps even to make sense of
a statute, textualists necessarily consider how language is conventionally
84. 1 owe the coinage of "intention free textualism" to Alexander & Prakash, supra note 11, at
968 ("The defining feature of this form of textualism is the insistence that intentions play no role in the
production of meaning, and so we call this view 'intention free textualism,' or 'IF textualism."').
85. See Manning, supra note 9, at 434-438 (discussing the distinction between the two types of
intent).
86. The potential for divergence is evident in cases where a clear statute's semantic meaning is in
tension with statements contained in the legislative history.
87. See supra notes 40-42.
88. See supra note 40. Cf Greenawalt, supra note 30, at 1658 ("Proponents of a reader
understanding approach assume that the reader has some idea of the broad objectives lying behind
legislation.").
89. Scalia, supra note 8, at 17 (describing the textualist search for "the intent that a reasonable
person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.").
John Manning has recently suggested that where a statute is ambiguous, textualists also look for an
objective statutory purpose. See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists From Purposivists?, 106
COLUM. L. REv. 70, 85 (2006) (describing a textualist belief that "interpreters can (at least sometimes)
draw a suitably objective inference of purpose-presumably one that a 'reasonable user of words' would
arrive at after reading the entire text in context.").
90. See Manning, supra note 20, at 110 ("If the meaning of words is a function of the way
speakers use them in context, it follows that the identical words may have different meanings when used
in different contexts.").
91. See supra notes 40-42.
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used.92 An important consequence of this approach is that an assumed
intent plays a role in textualists' thinking. In Justice Scalia's words,
when comparing what a text is reasonably understood to mean and what
it is intended to mean, these concepts "chase one another back and forth
to some extent, since the import of language depends upon its context,
which includes the occasion for, and hence the evident purpose of, its
utterance."
93
Absent consideration of an author's apparent intent, courts could be
ignoring the objective meaning of the statute. In Smith v. United States,
for example, the Supreme Court confronted a statute which enhanced a
criminal sentence when a person "'during and in relation to any crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime ... uses or carries a firearm."' 94 The
Court majority determined that an individual who traded his gun for
drugs had "used" a firearm for these purposes.95
Justice Scalia concluded otherwise.96  Dissenting, he argued as
follows:
To use an instrumentality ordinarily means to use it for its intended
purpose. When someone asks, "Do you use a cane?," he is not inquiring
whether you have your grandfather's silver-handled walking stick on
display in the hall; he wants to know whether you walk with a cane.
Similarly, to speak of "using a firearm" is to speak of using it for its
distinctive purpose, i.e., as a weapon.
97
This rationale reflects a concern with what a speaker would
conventionally intend when referring to "use" in the context of a
firearm.
As these disputes indicate, people recognize different senses of
"meaning." For this reason, philosophers of language sometimes divide
the meaning of an utterance into its "sentence meaning" and "speaker's
meaning." 98 The sentence meaning is the semantic meaning of a text,
92. See Manning, supra note 20, at 110-11. For that matter, if they want to engage in
interpretation that resembles normal usage of language, they must look to intent.
93. Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 129, 144 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1997). See also Nelson, supra note 11, at 354 n.21 (citing support for view that textualists are ultimately
interested in what Congress intended).
94. 508 U.S. 223, 227 (1993) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)(1)).
95. Id. at 237.
96. Id. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 242.
98. Adler, supra note 56, at 1384-96 (describing the two concepts); Hurd, supra note 56, at 962-
68 (same). It is possible to divide the forms of meaning further. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, The
Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 151, 247-48 (1981) (describing sentence meaning, utterance
meaning, and speaker's meaning-utterance meaning would cover the meaning of a statement in a
particular case of its use). For purposes of this article, the above phrasing will be used, but it should be
noted that there is variation of terminology in this context.
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and it is understood in terms of conventions shared by the relevant
linguistic community. 99 The speaker's meaning is the subjective intent
of the text's author-what the author meant her words to say.'00 These
concepts are useful for discussing the textualist approach, which can be
unnecessarily tangled in different understandings of "meaning."
In order to communicate successfully, there must be an understanding
of sentence meaning that operates independently of speaker's
meaning.'0 ' A conventional, non-subjective meaning of a phrase is
required; otherwise there would often be no way to determine what a
speaker's true meaning might be. To take an oft-used example, suppose
a madman shouts "Gleeg! Gleeg! Gleeg!," in an effort to indicate that it
is snowing in Tibet. 0 2  Since no sentence meaning exists in this case,
knowing the speaker's meaning on the basis of the language used would
be impossible. 1
03
Conversely, it is not necessary to know the speaker's meaning when
interpreting a text in order to make sense of it in conventional terms.
Suppose you walk up to a stranger and ask what time it is. If he says,
99. See Adler, supra note 56, at 1393 ("Roughly, sentence meaning is the kind of linguistic
meaning attached to a well-formed sentence, independent of the communicative intentions (or other
mental states) that happen to be held by those who utter the sentence."); id. at 1394 ("More crisply, the
sentence meaning of a linguistic utterance is what the utterance conventionally communicates.").
100. See id. at 1387 ("Very roughly, the speaker's meaning of a linguistic utterance is what the
speaker intends by that utterance.").
101. See, e.g., Hurd, supra note 56, at 966-67 ("It is precisely because Grice failed to reduce
sentence meaning to speaker's intentions that those who wish to appeal to drafters' intent when
interpreting statutes may use speakers' intentions to clarify and elucidate sentence meaning. In other
words, it is because sentence meaning is not the same as speaker's intentions that the latter can
supplement the former in legal interpretation."). See also id. at 965 n.52 ("To suggest that meaning
should be fixed by the intentions with which sentences are uttered would be to suggest that sentences
have, by themselves, no meaning independent of those intentions. Were this the case, no one could
express intentions."). Cf Moore, supra note 98, at 248 ("A speaker cannot literally arrogate to himself
Humpty Dumpty's power to 'make words mean what he pleases' (although he can mean what he pleases
by them).").
102. See, e.g., Hurd, supra note 56, at 962 (citing Paul Ziff, On H.P. Grice's Account of Meaning,
in READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 444, 447-48 (J. Rosenberg & C. Travis eds., 1971)).
103. See id. at 963 ("It cannot be said in such a case that the speaker's [meaning] tells us anything
about the sentence's meaning."). See also Moore, supra note 98, at 252 (using a variation of this
example with reference to a statute); Manning, supra note 12, at 2457 n.257 (citing this example in
support of the idea that there are "general understandings of language"). Alexander & Prakash respond
to this argument by noting that apparent nonsense can be meaningful:
"Gleeg, gleeg, gleeg" is the attempt at a reductio that textualists throw up at
intentionalists. The problem is that it is not reductio. "Gleeg, gleeg, gleeg" can be as
meaningful as the third base coach's pulling on his ear with the successful intent to
convey the idea "Bunt!"
Alexander & Prakash, supra note 11, at 978 n.27. However, this example presumes conventions that
render would-be nonsense meaningful. The textualist point is that the conventional meaning is a thing
separate and apart from the speaker's meaning.
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"It's three o'clock," the sentence meaning of that phrase is quite clear
given the context. The speaker, for some private reason, may have
intended his response to mean that the sky is falling. Yet it doesn't
matter what the speaker actually intended for purposes of understanding
the conventional import of his remarks.
Textualist courts do not look for a speaker's meaning separate from
what is conveyed by an unambiguous text, read in context. Even though
the court may presume a speaker's meaning for purposes of interpreting
a statute, the court does not seek the speaker's meaning as such.
Whether or not a legislative speaker's meaning can exist-many
textualists claim that it cannot-textualist courts look elsewhere in the
case of an unambiguous statute. Nothing in the nature of language use
requires that they do otherwise.
Admittedly, textualists sometimes suggest that a speaker's meaning is
relevant to their analysis. 10 4 For example, in Connecticut National Bank
v. Germain, the Court concluded it "must presume that [the] legislature
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says
there.' 105  This presumption could imply an ultimate interest in
speaker's meaning. Some may see the express text as the best way of
attaining that meaning.
10 6
Textualists have also been known to interpret a statute in terms of
legislative "intent."' 0 7 Yet the occasional rhetorical nod to intent is not
an intrinsic part of textualist interpretive methodology. Statements that
refer to legislative intent, or the purpose of a statute, show the trappings
of intentionalist thinking. They are nevertheless also consistent with the
view that texts are understandable in light of an "objectified" intent.
Reference to "intent" does not mean the interpreter is interested in
whether a speaker's meaning truly exists, or in what that speaker's
meaning might be.
Despite haphazard reference to a statutory text's meaning in terms of
legislative intent, the goal for the textualist court is not literally to descry
a legislative intent. In Judge Easterbrook's words: "Statutes are law, not
evidence of law."'1 8  Taken at face value, this claim is not a mere
104. For a list of examples, see Solan, supra note 56, at 455-57.
105. 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992).
106. Cf Nelson, supra note 11, at 417 ("Within certain constraints, all mainstream interpreters
seek the meaning intended by the enacting legislature.").
107. See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (Scalia, J.) ("The
question, at bottom, is one of statutory intent, and we accordingly 'begin with the language employed by
Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the
legislative purpose."') (quoting FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 56 (1990) (quoting Park 'N Fly,
Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985)).
108. In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989).
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reformulation of intentionalism.
E. The Formal Importance of Objectified Intent
Even if one can build a wall between sentence meaning and speaker's
meaning, it does not follow that one should. There is something unusual
about interpreting texts in this way-this is not how people engage in
conversation. We normally think of the speaker's meaning when we try
to interpret what someone says to us. 109 When a listener is unsure what
a speaker means, she may ask for clarification. It is arguable that, even
if legislative intent is hard to determine, one should at least try to find it,
and consider as much evidence as possible when doing so.'10
Yet the line between apparent and actual intent is not artificial, and
reflects an insight about the nature of legislative acts. Legislation exists
in its final, written form, and only this finalized version binds the public.
Inquiries into the subjective intent behind a statute place a substantial
burden on individuals who must follow the law."' And, although
legislative history is now easier to obtain than it once was, law still
differs from conversational language.11 2  Law has an existence for the
public detached from its authors' intentions.
Consider the following example, provided by Caleb Nelson:
[S]uppose that on the same day that Congress enacts a statute regulating
the fees of "lawyers," members of Congress and the President prepare
secret statements explaining that they were using the word "lawyers" to
109. Lawrence Solan suggests that there is little choice in thinking in terms of a speaker's intent.
See Solan, supra note 56, at 429 ("[E]ven when there is no dispute about meaning, intent lurks in the
background as a crucial element of our understanding."). See also Alexander & Prakash, supra note 11,
at 979 ("We believe that context is universally regarded as relevant only because it is evidence of
authorial intent.").
110. Cf Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 65 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("In recent years the Court has suggested that we should only look at legislative history for the purpose
of resolving textual ambiguities or to avoid absurdities. It would be wiser to acknowledge that it is
always appropriate to consider all available evidence of Congress' true intent when interpreting its work
product.") For support, Justice Stevens cites United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805)
(Marshall, C.J.) ("Where the mind labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing
from which aid can be derived.").
11. Cf Scalia, supra note 8, at 17 (comparing judicial application of what the lawgiver meant
instead of what was promulgated to "the trick the emperor Nero was said to engage in: posting edicts
high up on the pillars, so that they could not easily be read.").
112. Cf Nelson, supra note 11, at 367 ("[I]t is hard to believe that the textualists' position on
legislative history really reflects special sensitivity to the goal of fair notice, because the most widely
used kinds of legislative history are now no less available to the citizenry than the statutory texts they
purport to explain."). But cf OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 67, at 52 ("If the average citizen is
presumed to be aware of the legislative history as well as the statute, are we then enforcing not simply
an unknown but almost unknowable laws?").
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mean "doctors" throughout the statute. These statements are sealed in
envelopes, to be opened only in the event of litigation about the statute's
meaning. Even if there is no reason to doubt their accuracy, and even if
members of the enacting Congress genuinely expected courts to give the
statutory language the private meaning that the statements illuminate, I
am unaware of any judges who would actually do so. 113
This scenario is unlikely to transpire, but it illustrates the normative
significance of the divide between sentence meaning and speaker's
meaning. A search for the legislature's apparent intent-as evidenced
by a contextual reading of the statutory language-serves a different,
sometimes conflicting purpose from a search for the subjective
intentions of actual legislators.
Statutes in themselves offer little for a reader to consult beyond the
text."14 Assumptions about the author, the language, and the setting of
the language's use, are necessary in order to intelligently read a text.
115
And indeed, textualists make a number of assumptions of this type. A
basic example is the assumption by United States courts that statutes are
written in English. 1 6  Nevertheless, most of the usual conversational
cues that provide context for spoken language are absent from a statute.
In this manner the primary source of a legislative document's
objective meaning is its text. 1 7  The absence of conversational cues
arises not merely because statutes are law. Statutes are enacted through
a process that eliminates many of the signals that accompany a spoken
utterance, and they qualify as statutes only in their final version. One
has but to imagine a statute enacted sarcastically, with hyperbole, or in
an ironic tone, to see the difficulty that laws pose for conversational
norms of understanding."
8
113. Nelson, supra note 11, at 360 n.36. See also Greenawalt, supra note 30, at 1620 ("For many
technical statutes, the relevant readers may be trained lawyers or experts in the field, but the meaning
that statutory words convey to the readers that count bears on how judges should interpret those
words.").
114. Cf Peter M. Tiersma, A Message in a Bottle: Text, Autonomy, and Statutory Interpretation,
76 TUL. L. REv. 431, 445 (2001) ("Written texts typically differ from spoken language in that they tend
to be much more autonomous. With an autonomous document, you strive to include in the text itself
everything that the reader needs to understand it. You do this because you may be separated from the
reader in time or space, and often in both.").
115. Without making such assumptions, the text would be incomprehensible, at least as a text. Cf
Alexander & Prakash, supra note 11, at 977 (suggesting that if one does not recognize an author, a text
has no meaning).
116. Cf id. at 974-75 (describing potential difficulties if one does not identify the language of a
text).
117. A text's context also plays a role in interpreting a statute, especially in cases of ambiguous
texts. Contextual clues are nevertheless limited for purposes of understanding laws in ways that do not
apply to spoken words.
118. Jonathan Siegel makes this point:
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Peter Tiersma has aptly compared a statute to a message in a bottle,
set adrift on the ocean."l 9  In Tiersma's terms, such messages are
"autonomous."' 120  A potential rescuer who reads the message can only
consult the message's words, with little context. As Tiersma notes:
Virtually nothing is communicated by nonlinguistic channels, which
means that the entire message must be expressed in words. The text may
not be read until months or years after it is created. And the reader will
have little or no opportunity to ask questions or request clarification.
Thus, all communicative intentions must be in the text itself.
121
Tiersma is not an orthodox textualist, but the concept of autonomous
documents provides an explanation for why textualists rely exclusively
on objectified intent.' 22 If a statute is seen as an autonomous document,
a search for actual legislative intent is questionable, even if this intent
could be reliably ascertained. In this respect at least, a law is like a
poem, where the authorial intent does not provide the textual
meaning. 23  To interpret the text in light of actual legislative intent is
The techniques of understanding natural language in ordinary conversation cannot all be
uncritically imported into the task of statutory interpretation.... Professor Sinclair, for
example, observes that legislative speech is one-sided, rather than a conversation between
two interlocutors; that legislative utterances are not "true" or "false" the way a statement
made in ordinary conversation might be; and that legislatures do not use sarcasm, irony,
or metaphor as an ordinary speaker might.
Siegel, supra note 12, at 347 (citing M.B.W. Sinclair, Law and Language: The Role of Pragmatics in
Statutory Interpretation, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 373, 385-90 (1985)). Cf Moore, supra note 98, at 188-92
(describing difficulties in interpreting metaphors in legislation). Unsurprisingly, figures of speech are
uncommon in statutes. Cf Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in
Statutory Interpretation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 339, 366-67 (2005) ("Humor is not a quality one typically
associates with statutes, so it seems appropriate to assume, as a general matter, that a legislature has not
created a statutory syllepsis.").
119. See Tiersma, supra note 114, at 433.
120. Id.
121. Id. This analogy explains one of the attractions of textualism. See id. at 434 ("Consequently,
despite claims of its detractors, the plain meaning rule and textualism are not as naive as one might
think. There is, in fact, a natural tendency to interpret statutes as autonomous written texts.").
122. Tiersma would adopt textualism when interpreting penal statutes, but is skeptical in other
contexts. See id. at 434-35. He concludes: "Everyone should be a textualist sometimes. But no one
should always be one." Id. at 482.
123. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, On the contribution of poetry to the search for truth, in THE
RELEVANCE OF THE BEAUTIFUL AND OTHER ESSAYS 105, 107 (Nicholas Walker, trans., Robert
Bemasconi ed., 1998) ("We have not even begun to approach the poem if we try to go beyond it by
asking about the author and what he intends by it."). This point is not intended as an endorsement of
methods used to interpret poems in general. Cf Greenawalt, supra note 30, at 1618 (noting that it is
often suggested "whatever a poem means to a reader is its meaning for that individual."). As
Greenawalt notes, "[f]or statutory and constitutional provisions, such individualist approaches cannot
afford an appropriate interpretive standard." Id. See also Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and
Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 362 (1992) (critiquing the application of literary interpretation to
legal texts).
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potentially to revise the text.
For textualists, evidence of legislative intent assumes a different role
than it might otherwise have. Legislative history does not possess the
same author as the final legislative draft-and legislative history is
generally not communicated with the statutory text.124  A statute's
drafting history can, perhaps, elucidate what some authors intended at a
moment in time, but it is not relevant for a reader of the statute qua
statute. 125  Pre-enactment evidence of intent is not generally part of the
legislative utterance.1
2 6
F. The Issue of Faithful Agency
Objectified intent and actual intent are different in their interpretive
significance. The textualist's "objectified intent" prevails over actual
intent because it fills in the meaning of the law. Yet this raises questions
about the function of courts. Discarding a known legislative intent is
potentially problematic if one's goal is to enforce statutes the way
Congress desired.
127
124. Manning makes a similar point from a structural perspective:
[Elven if the elaborations of meaning found in the legislative history potentially reflected
some broader understanding, one might nonetheless wish to insist upon its expression in a
format-the statutory text-that is subject to the full constitutional process of
bicameralism and presentment. Only in that way would one have assurance that the
norms expressed in a committee report or sponsor's statement reflected not merely the
views of a hypothetical legislative majority, but also a position capable of surviving the
cumbersome and elaborate process of enactment.
Manning, supra note 9, at 426 n.23.
125. Jeremy Waldron has eloquently expressed this point:
For if a judge appeals beyond a statute to the intentions of particular legislators, he will
be appealing to things said or done during the course of the bill's passage. At that stage
the decisive synthesis may not have emerged or crystallized in individual minds, and we
may be dealing with what can only be described pro tern as 'the reconciling of
opposites.., by the rough process of a struggle between combatants fighting under
hostile banners.'
Waldron, supra note 61, at 352 (citing J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 58 (1955)).
126. A notable exception could exist in cases where the legislation cross references legislative
history. Cf. Siegel, supra note 72.
127. Alexander and Prakash suggest it is paradoxical to assume that legislators would want their
subjective intentions to be irrelevant in interpreting the statutes they enact. See Alexander & Prakash,
supra note 11, at 974 n.2 1. This is not inherently so. In some cases an author may prefer textualism as a
means of limiting the risk of judicial error. Cf. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and
the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003) (describing how commercial contracting parties
may prefer a textualist interpretation of their agreements). A legislator may have a preference that a
court apply a textualist interpretive methodology, even if there is a risk that sometimes the court will
find a semantic meaning inconsistent with his subjective belief Assuming the legislator believes courts
are more error prone when they use an intentionalist approach, such a preference can be rational. Cf
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A view of courts as faithful agents of Congress is longstanding and
seems to require enforcement of actual legislative intent. 128  Moreover,
textualists themselves have described the courts' role as that of a faithful
agent.129 By interpreting statutes in accord with the conventional
meaning of the language used, textualists contend courts are being
faithful to the legislature's command.130  Consequently, an
unwillingness to interpret statutes in light of an actual legislative
intent-assuming there is a reliable means to determine this intent-
appears to conflict with a fundamental premise of textualist thought.'
31
Critics are right to challenge the textualist claim of faithful agency.
Whatever one's view of textualism generally, faithful agency is a
misnomer in this context. Under black-letter agency law, an agent must
act loyally on behalf of a principal, 132 and technical readings of a
Nelson, A Response, supra note 38, at 462 (suggesting that "people with certain intuitions may well
surmise that in the aggregate, courts will better reflect the meaning intended by contracting parties if
they conclusively presume.., that the parties were using 'majority talk"' and noting that this same view
could apply when interpreting statutes).
128. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REv. 405,
415 (1989) ("According to the most prominent conception of the role of courts in statutory construction,
judges are agents or servants of the legislature."). On the relation of this theory to legislative intent, see
Nelson, supra note 11, at 371-72 ("It is quite common... for textualists to portray themselves as
'faithful agents' of the enacting legislature. If textualists entirely rejected the notion of collective intent,
then this self-conception would be mystifying: what does it mean to be 'faithful' to a principal that is not
sentient and that lacks any coherent understanding of its own commands?"). It should be noted that not
everyone accepts faithful agency as the correct conception of the judicial role. For example, William
Eskridge has suggested that partnership concepts should also be considered. See William N. Eskridge,
Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial Power" in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-
1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 992 (2001) ("In my view, Article III judges interpreting statutes are
both agents carrying out directives laid down by the legislature and partners in the enterprise of law
elaboration, for they (like the legislature) are ultimately agents of 'We the People."').
129. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 20, at 7 ("[T]extualism also starts from the faithful agent
premise-that a federal court is responsible for accurately deciphering and implementing the
legislature's commands."). See also Manning, supra note 9, at 423 ("In any system predicated on
legislative supremacy, a faithful agent will of course seek the legislature's intended meaning in some
sense, and modem textualists do situate themselves in that tradition."). Cf Easterbrook, supra note 32,
at 63 (describing political society's view that "[w]e are supposed to be faithful agents, not independent
principals.").
130. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 20, at 7.
131. As Alexander & Prakash note:
Textualists acknowledge that Congress has the right to place a set of marks on a page.
But they forbid Congress from selecting the meaning of those marks. Instead, the
meanings of those marks are supposed to be fixed according to a set of rules that are
(relatively) independent of Congress .... Whatever the merits of textualism, it does not
strike us as a theory where the interpreter acts as a faithful agent of Congress.
Alexander & Prakash, supra note 11, at 993. See also id. at 970.
132. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958) ("Agency is the fiduciary relation which
results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf
and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.").
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principal's requests may conflict with this goal.1 33  Principal-agent
relationships do not accurately reflect the judicial role as applied by
textualist courts.
In light of this doctrinal inconsistency, it is more accurate to see the
faithful-agent concept as a metaphor. A court is a "faithful agent" for
textualist purposes insofar as a court follows the law's command, not the
legislature's command-courts are not literally agents of Congress.'
34
Textualists sometimes endorse the faithful agent concept, but they
generally do so in terms of fealty to the text Congress adopted.'35 For
example, Manning has argued that courts must be faithful agents of
Congress, while adding, in the same paragraph, that textualists "deny
that a legislature has any shared intention that lies behind but differs
from the reasonable import of the words adopted."'
3 6
The judiciary has no duty of loyalty to Congress as an entity, nor
should it under a system of separated powers. 137 Judicial independence
is a fundamental feature of the judicial role, which by its nature requires
decisions that will contravene legislative preferences. In addition, the
Presentment Clause limits the faithful agent concept-aside from
appropriately enacted statutes, signed by the president or passed with a
veto-proof majority, legislative intentions are not part of the law. 138
Thus, the court does not seek to determine what Congress wanted it to
do-it is concerned only with what a piece of properly enacted
legislation objectively means.' 39  This perspective emphasizes the idea
133. Cf Greenawalt, supra note 30, at 1625 (concluding that, "for many informal instructions, a
recipient should pay attention to the giver's intent and interpret the instructions accordingly, even if she
would reach a different conclusion based on the instructions alone."). See also Lon L. Fuller, The Case
of the Speluncean Explorers, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1851, 1858-59 (1999) ("No superior wants a servant
who lacks the capacity to read between the lines.").
134. Cf Easterbrook, supra note 32, at 68 ("No matter how well we can know the wishes and
desires of legislators, the only way the legislature issues binding commands is to embed them in a
law.").
135. For example, in an article which describes the policy that judges should be faithful agents,
Judge Easterbrook also concludes that "statutory text and structure, as opposed to legislative history and
intent (actual or imputed), supply the proper foundation for meaning." Easterbrook, supra note 32, at
67. See also Easterbrook, supra note 46, at 446-47 (noting distinctions between the legislature-judge
relationship and the standard principal-agent relationship).
136. Manning, supra note 9, at 430.
137. Were courts truly agents of Congress, the legislature would presumably be able to correct
what it considered incorrect decisions of the courts. But cf Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S.
211, 222 (1994) (discussing the Framers' rejection of that idea). In addition, retroactive legislative
history could be useful in interpreting statutes, since it would represent Congress's present preferences.
But cf Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct.. 2611, 2627 (2005) (refusing to
recognize amendment to a statute through post hoc legislative history).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69 . See also Easterbrook, supra note 46, at 447
(discussing the "many rules that tie the hands" of a legislative "principal").
139. Cf Joseph Raz, Interpretation Without Retrieval, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN
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of a rule of laws, rather than a rule of legislators. 140  Generally
applicable laws, prospective in nature, are considered separate from both
the will of legislators 14 1 and the will of judges. 142
As Jeremy Waldron has noted, "it is an important part of our
normative concept of legal authority that legislators themselves should
be bound by the laws they enact."' 143  The thought that legislators are
bound by what they choose to enact modifies the concept of a faithful
agent; so understood, the command of legislation exists independently of
its authors.
III. ABSURD RESULTS AND SCRIVENER'S ERRORS
The analysis above explains how textualists may interpret statutes
without reference to subjective legislative intent. The outcome of a
strict reading of statutory language can be jarring, nonetheless. A safety
valve for such situations is to look to the absurdity and scrivener's error
doctrines. 144  Both doctrines appear to justify deviations from a clear
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 155, 161 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995) ("Artists, like legislators know (when they do)
that the meaning of their work is that which can be gauged without regard to the private context, and
therefore they will create works which have the meaning they intend when so understood.").
140. For example, consider the following argument from Justice Scalia:
Government by unexpressed intent is similarly tyrannical. It is the law that governs, not
the intent of the lawgiver. That seems to me the essence of the famous American ideal
set forth in the Massachusetts constitution: A government of laws, not of men. Men may
intend what they will; but it is only the laws that they enact which bind us.
Scalia, supra note 8, at 17.
141. See, e.g., LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 217 (rev. ed., 1969) ("The publication of
rules plainly carries with it the 'social meaning' that the rulemaker will himself abide by his own
rules."); id. at 218 ("Lilburne demands to know 'whether ever the Commonwealth, when they chose the
Parliament, gave them a lawless and unlimited power, and at their pleasure to walk contrary to their own
laws and ordinances before they have repealed them?') (citing JOHN LILBURNE, ENGLAND'S BIRTH-
RIGHT JUSTIFIED (1645)). See also FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 153 (1960)
("It is because the lawgiver does not know the particular cases to which his rules will apply, and it is
because the judge who applies them has no choice in drawing the conclusions that follow from the
existing body of rules and the particular facts of the case, that it can be said that laws and not men rule.")
142. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheaton) 738, 866 (1824) (Marshall,
C.J.) ("Judicial power, as contradistinguished from the power of laws, has no existence. Courts are the
mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing."). See also MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, XI,
6 ("[T]he national judges are no more than the mouth that pronounces the words of the law, mere
passive beings, incapable of moderating either its force or rigor.").
143. Jeremy Waldron, Legislators' Intentions and Unintentional Legislation, in LAW AND
INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 329, 349 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995). See also
HAYEK, supra note 141, at 155 ("The chief safeguard is that the rules must apply to those who lay them
down and those who apply them-that is, to the government as well as the governed-and that nobody
has the power to grant exceptions."); Easterbrook, supra note 46, at 447 ("With legislation, the
'principal' is not the sitting Congress but the enacting one (or perhaps the polity as a whole).").
144. See Manning, supra note 20, at 118 (suggesting that the absurdity doctrine provides an
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statutory text, and courts describe their application in these terms. 145
The following Sections outline each doctrine.
A. The Absurdity Doctrine
As noted, the absurdity doctrine permits courts to avoid an absurd
application of an otherwise clear statute. Within this doctrine, judicial
theories proceed along a continuum. Some cases involve applications of
laws which produce "odd results," or appear strongly inconsistent with
legislative policy. Other cases involve extreme departures from societal
norms. Precedent varies as to how absurd a statutory application must
be to trigger the absurdity doctrine.
One of the most famous absurdity cases is Holy Trinity Church v.
United States.146 In that case, the Supreme Court interpreted the Alien
Contract Labor Act, which made it unlawful for any person, company,
partnership, or corporation to "in any way assist or encourage the
importation or migration, of any alien or aliens" into the United
States.147  The Holy Trinity Church had contracted with a Reverend
Warren to immigrate to the United States as a pastor for the church. 1
4 8
The church's contract fell within the letter of the statute. However,
the Supreme Court concluded that the statute did not apply in this
context, despite the statutory text. As the Court explained its reasoning:
This is not the substitution of the will of the judge for that of the
legislator; for frequently words of general meaning are used in a statute,
words broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a consideration
of the whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its
enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such broad
meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator
intended to include the particular act. 149
The Court reasoned that the application at issue could not be within the
statute, given the Christian history of America: "the general language
important, albeit limited, safety valve.) But cf Nagle, supra note 12, at 3 (asking the question, "[w]hy
does textualism need a safety valve?").
145. See Dodd v. United States, 125 S. Ct.. 2478, 2483 (2005) ("[W]hen the statute's language is
plain, the sole function of the courts-at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd-
is to enforce it according to its terms.") (quotation marks omitted). Cf Siegel, supra note 12, at 334
("The meaning of a statute, assuming it to be clear, does not change because it is absurd.").
146. 143 U.S. 457 (1892). For recent analyses of this case, see Adrian Vermeule, Legislative
History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1833 (1998); Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity: Spirit, Letter, And History
in Statutory Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901 (2000).
147. Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 458.
148. See id. at 457-58.
149. Id. at459.
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thus employed is broad enough to reach cases and acts which the whole
history and life of the country affirm could not have been intentionally
legislated against.''
150
A more recent decision along these lines is Public Citizen v. United
States Department of Justice.15 1 In Public Citizen, the Court addressed
the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), which regulates "federal
advisory committees." 152  These committees are defined as a group
"established or utilized by one or more agencies, in the interest of
obtaining advice or recommendations for the President or one or more
agencies or officers of the Federal Government.' ' 153 At issue in this case
was the applicability of these regulations to the American Bar
Association's Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary.
The Public Citizen Court determined that the statute did not cover the
ABA Standing Committee, despite the Department of Justice's use of
that committee to evaluate prospective judicial nominees. 154 The key to
the opinion was the meaning of the verb "utilize. ' 15  The Court
determined that if Congress intended a "straightforward reading" of the
word "utilize," it would force the President to meet all of FACA's
restrictions, even for consulting with his political party when selecting
his cabinet. 156 The Court concluded it was appropriate to look past a
literal reading of a statutory term when it would "compel an odd
result."' 57 In light of this reading, the Public Citizen majority turned to
legislative history and the constitutional avoidance doctrine, and
concluded that the ABA Standing Committee was not covered by the
Act. 158
Cases like Holy Trinity Church and Public Citizen permit judges to
avoid literal readings when they believe that specific applications of a
statute are inconsistent with what Congress intended. Indeed, the Public
Citizen Court suggested that something less than absurdity was
sufficient to justify departure from the letter of a statute, in light of
legislative history.
159
150. Id. at 472.
151. 491 U.S. 440 (1989).
152. Id. at 445-47 (describing the statute and its application).
153. Id. at 451 (quoting 5 U.S.C. app. §3(2)).
154. Id. at 467.
155. Id. at 453.
156. Id. ("Nor can Congress have meant-as a straightforward reading of 'utilize' would appear to
require-that all of FACA's restrictions apply if a President consults with his own political party before
picking his Cabinet.").
157. Id. at 454.
158. Id. at 455-67.
159. See id. at 453 n.9 (suggesting that it is appropriate to use "all available materials in
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Other decisions impose a higher hurdle for deviations from literal
text. Chief Justice Marshall, for example, argued that it is appropriate to
avoid applying a provision when "the absurdity and injustice of applying
the provision to the case, would be so monstrous, that all mankind
would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application.' 60  This
level of absurdity is of a different type from the foregoing cases: it calls
for courts to reject readings of a statute that are unthinkable.' 6'
Several of the classic absurdity cases meet this standard. For
example, in United States v. Kirby, a sheriff executed an arrest warrant
against a mail carrier for murder. 62  A prosecutor then filed charges
against the sheriff under a federal statute that made it a crime to willfully
interfere with the delivery of the mail. 63 The Supreme Court concluded
that the law did not apply in these circumstances, in light of "common
sense." 1
64
The Kirby Court cited two examples for support, both of which are
frequently offered as examples of true absurdities:
The common sense of man approves the judgment mentioned by
Puffendorf, that the Bolognian law which enacted, 'that whoever drew
blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity,' did not
extend to the surgeon who opened the vein of a person that fell down in
the street in a fit. The same common sense accepts the ruling, cited by
Plowden, that the statute of 1st Edward II, which enacts that a prisoner
who breaks prison shall be guilty of felony, does not extend to a prisoner
who breaks out when the prison is on fire-'for he is not to be hanged
because he would not stay to be burnt.' 1
65
ascertaining the intent of our elected representatives, rather than read their enactments as requiring what
may seem a disturbingly unlikely result, provided only that the result is not 'absurd."').
160. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 203 (1819). Cf Crooks v. Harrelson, 282
U.S. 55, 60 (1930) ("[T]he principle is to be applied to override the literal terms of a statute only under
rare and exceptional circumstances.... [T]o justify a departure from the letter of the law upon that
ground, the absurdity must be so gross as to shock the general moral or common sense.").
161. Cf Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(suggesting it is appropriate to consult legislative history "to verify that what seems to us an unthinkable
disposition.., was indeed unthought of ... ").
162. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 484 (1868).
163. Id. at 483-85.
164. Id. at 487 ("And we think that a like common sense will sanction the ruling we make, that the
act of Congress which punishes the obstruction or retarding of the passage of the mail, or of its carrier,
does not apply to a case of temporary detention of the mail caused by the arrest of the carrier upon an
indictment for murder."). For a discussion of the background of this case, see David Achtenberg, With
Malice Toward Some: United States v. Kirby, Malicious Prosecution, and The Fourteenth Amendment,
26 RUTGERS L.J. 273 (1995) (describing how the case was the product of Union and Confederate
disputes). See also Nagle, supra note 12, at II (discussing Achtenberg's article as evidence that the
application of the absurd results rule may have worked an injustice).
165. Kirby, 74 U.S. at 487.
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In each of these latter instances, there is something not only absurd, but
monstrous, in applying the statutory language to the particular case.
While these cases could meet Chief Justice Marshall's test for an
application of the law which all would unite in rejecting, it is debatable
whether cases like Public Citizen do. This Article suggests that only the
most extreme instances of absurdity support a textualist use of the
absurdity doctrine.
B. The Scrivener's Error Doctrine
The scrivener's error doctrine permits courts to amend a statutory text
where it clearly results from a drafting error. Scrivener's errors may
resemble statutory absurdities, since an obvious error frequently
produces an absurd text.166 In this regard, the scrivener's error doctrine
overlaps with the absurdity doctrine. The two doctrines are
distinguishable, however, on the theory that the scrivener's error
doctrine addresses an "error of expression," while the absurdity doctrine
addresses unforeseen, egregious applications of statutory language.'
67
A good example of a scrivener's error case is Scurto v. Le Blanc.'68
There, the Louisiana Supreme Court addressed a statute that permitted
litigants to impeach witness testimony "in any unlawful way."'
' 69
Should one take this statute literally, all manner of illegal methods could
be used to demonstrate that a witness is lying. 170  Instead, the Court
made a straightforward determination that "this substitution of the word
'unlawful' for the word 'lawful' was an accident," and interpreted the
166. Cf Manning, supra note 12, at 2459 n.265 ("As presently conceived by some members of the
Court (including Justice Scalia), the scrivener's error doctrine is apparently a form of the absurdity
doctrine; it identifies scrivener's errors by asking whether Congress could have intended to adopt the
policy that the text clearly suggests.").
167. See Fried, supra note 13, at 595 (describing scrivener's error doctrine in terms of an "error of
expression"); Scalia, supra note 8, at 20 (suggesting the doctrine applies where "on the very face of the
statute it is clear to the reader that a mistake of expression (rather than of legislative wisdom) has been
made"). See also Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 115, 116 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997) (noting the "crucial distinction between what some officials intended to say in
enacting the language they used, and they intended-or expected or hoped-would be the consequence
of their saying it.").
168. 184 So. 567 (La. 1938). For further discussion of this case, see Fried, supra note 13, at 590.
169. Scurto, 184 So. at 574 (describing an "inadvertent" legislative substitution of the word
"unlawful" for "lawful").
170. As Michael Fried suggests, "[i]f a party sought to test the credibility of an opponent by
submerging the opponent under water to see whether the opponent floated, then-such conduct clearly
being an unlawful means of impeachment-the party could not be estopped under the rule." See Fried,
supra note 13, at 589-90.
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statute as if it had said "lawful."'
' 7
'
Other cases involve obvious punctuation errors, or cross-references to
clearly wrong sections of a statute. 172 In some of these situations, the
scrivener's error doctrine is necessary to avoid nonsense-without
revision, the statutory language would be gibberish. 173  More
controversial decisions involve plausible statutory results that
nonetheless look like the product of a typographical error.
For example, in United States v. Locke, the Federal Land Policy
Management Act provided that mining claim filings must be made
"prior to December 31 of each year."' 174 The appellees had filed their
claim on December 31, and argued that the statute should be construed
to require a filing "on or before" December 31.175 The Supreme Court
concluded that the text should be read as written.1 76 December 31 was
clearly not "prior to" December 31, and that clarity resolved the issue.
177
In dissent, Justice Stevens argued for the scrivener's error doctrine.
178
In his view, the Court's application of the statute was contrary to the
intent of Congress. 179 In addition, the statutory wording resulted from
an error. According to Stevens:
As the facts of this case demonstrate, the scrivener's error is one that can
be made in good faith.... That it was in fact an error seems rather clear
to me because no one has suggested any rational basis for omitting just
one day from the period in which an annual filing may be made, and I
would not presume that Congress deliberately created a trap for the
unwary by such an omission.
This proposed application of the use of the scrivener's error doctrine
thus appears to address word choices which produce results contrary to
legislative policy goals, where no rational basis would explain the word
choice at issue.
Justice Stevens has elaborated on this doctrine in recent cases. In
171. Scurto, 184 So. at 574.
172. See Manning, supra note 12, at 2459 n. 265 (discussing cases).
173. For example, where the literal meaning of a statute calls for a certificate to be furnished
"upon request of the... request" instead of "upon receipt of the ... request," the statute is incoherent.
See United States v. Scheer, 729 F.2d 164, 169 (2d Cir. 1984). The Court's application of the
scrivener's error doctrine avoids nonsense in such cases.
174. 471 U.S. 84, 93 (1985).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 96.
177. Id. ("The phrase 'prior to' may be clumsy, but its meaning is clear."). According to the
court, "with respect to filing deadlines a literal reading of Congress' words is generally the only proper
reading of those words." Id. at 93.
178. Id. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 120-23.
180. Id. at 123.
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Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, Stevens concurred to address
the application of the scrivener's error doctrine to a clause of the Truth
in Lending Act.18' The resolution of the case turned on the meaning of
the phrase: "under this subparagraph." 182 Depending upon how these
words were interpreted, statutory damages would be capped at $1000 (as
they had been prior to a statutory amendment), or else the cap would no
longer exist. 183 The Court majority determined that the provision at
issue was unclear, but that in light of legislative history, the $1000
damages cap still applied. 1
84
Stevens concluded the statutory text at issue was unambiguous,' 85 and
also that the statutory scheme was not "implausible."' 86 He felt the
Court could not "escape this unambiguous statutory command" because
of an absurd result.' 87 However, Stevens determined that this statutory
command could be avoided because the Court was able to use "common
sense."' 188 The legislative history indicated that Congress intended a
different result from the wording of the final text.189 In his view, this
"demonstrated that a busy Congress is fully capable of enacting a
scrivener's error into law."'
' 90
Textualist judges have defined the doctrine differently. In Green v.
Bock Laundry Mach. Co., the Supreme Court addressed Rule 609(a) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. 191 The Rule permitted impeachment of
witnesses based upon evidence of criminal convictions but only if "the
court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant."' 192 Presumably, this
language was aimed at prejudice to criminal defendants, not civil
defendants. 1
93
Read literally, the text at issue in Bock Laundry seemed to require the
odd result that civil defendants receive an evidentiary benefit not offered
181. 543 U.S. 50, 65 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring).
182. Id. at 55.
183. Id. at 53 (comparing the Fourth Circuit's reading with the Supreme Court majority's
reading).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 65 (Stevens, J., concurring).
186. Id. ("There is nothing implausible about a scheme that uses a formula to measure the
maximum recovery under (i) without designating a ceiling or floor.").
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
192. Id. at 509 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 609(a)).
193. Cf id. at 510 (describing constitutional distinctions between rights of criminal defendants
and civil litigants).
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to civil plaintiffs. Rather than countenance this result, the Court
concluded that the Rule permits impeachment of a civil witness with
evidence of prior convictions regardless of prejudice to the witness or
party offering the testimony.' 94  The majority considered the apparent
absurd results, and the legislative history, as support for its holding.'
95
Justice Scalia concurred, evincing a rare acceptance that a statute
should not be applied as literally written. In this instance, he noted, a
literal interpretation would produce "an absurd, and perhaps
unconstitutional, result."'1 96 On this basis, it was "appropriate to consult
all public materials ... to verify that what seems to us an unthinkable
disposition (civil defendants but not civil plaintiffs receive the benefit of
weighing prejudice) was indeed unthought of ... ,, In addition, the
case raised the specter of a scrivener's error. Scalia contended that the
word "criminal" in front of the word "defendant" was a qualification
"that could understandably have been omitted by inadvertence-and
sometimes is omitted in normal conversation .... "198
Scalia has since described his Bock Laundry concurrence in terms of
the scrivener's error doctrine.199  Dissenting in United States v.
X-citement Video, he explained that the scrivener's error doctrine
"permits a court to give an unusual (though not unheard-of) meaning to
a word which, if given its normal meaning, would produce an absurd
and arguably unconstitutional result." 200  This definition would
apparently limit the doctrine to cases where the text can bear the unusual
meaning. In addition:
[T]he sine qua non of any 'scrivener's error' doctrine... is that the
meaning genuinely intended but inadequately expressed must be
absolutely clear; otherwise we might be rewriting the statute rather than
correcting a technical mistake.
20 1
194. Id. at 527.
195. Id. at 511 (quoting Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 1987) (agreeing with the
Seventh Circuit that the Rule "can't mean what it says"); id. at 511-24 (describing history of Rule
609(a) and Rule 403).
196. Id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 529.
199. United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64, 82 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
200. Id. See also Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 163 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Since
there was here no contention of a 'scrivener's error' producing an absurd result, the plain text of the
statute should have made this litigation unnecessary and unmaintainable.").
201. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 82. See also United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 59
(1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I can neither pronounce the results reached by a straightforward reading
of the statute utterly absurd nor discern any other self-evident disposition for which they are an
obviously mistaken replacement."). The Granderson formulation may allow for a scrivener's error
doctrine that applies in cases not involving absurd results.
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Like the absurdity doctrine, the scrivener's error doctrine exists along
a continuum. As endorsed by Justice Stevens, the scrivener's error
doctrine permits courts to avoid a strict application of statutory text
when the court determines there was an error based on a countervailing
legislative purpose. Under this view, considerations of policy and
legislative goals are very much a part of the scrivener's error doctrine's
application.2 °2 Justice Scalia's approach requires the legislative intent to
be absolutely clear, and conceivably requires absurd results, in order to
trigger the doctrine. 0 3
As with the absurdity doctrine, the legitimacy of this doctrine for a
textualist method of interpretation depends upon the form the scrivener's
error doctrine takes.
C. Textualist Critiques and Proposed Solutions
Textualist judges strongly express the view that the absurdity and
scrivener's error doctrines should be read narrowly. These limits
mitigate the concern that textualism suffers from doctrinal
inconsistency-but they do not necessarily solve the problem. Even
narrow versions of these doctrines undercut textualist principles to the
extent courts are permitted to consider policy or legislative intent that
runs contrary to unambiguous statutory language.
The absurdity doctrine is not a typical interpretive canon within the
legal subcommunity. It is true that courts regularly presume legislators
draft statutes with the knowledge of established judicial conventions.20 4
202. Recent decisions suggest that the current Supreme Court does not endorse Justice Stevens'
conception of the scrivener's error doctrine. See, e.g., Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 542
(2004) ("It is beyond our province to rescue Congress from its drafting errors, and to provide for what
we might think ... is the preferred result.") (quoting United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 68
(1994) (Scalia, J., concurring)). Indeed, the Court has recently applied a difficult to meet standard for
the absurdity doctrine. See, e.g., Dodd v. United States, 125 S. Ct.. 2478 (2005) (interpreting a statute of
limitations for collateral attacks on criminal convictions such that it could run before the cause of action
accrued). Cf id. at 2488 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending that this statutory consequence is an
absurd result).
203. Jonathan Siegel provides a useful discussion of cases indicating Justice Scalia's views on the
importance of absurdity to the scrivener's error doctrine. See Siegel, supra note 12, at 330-32. As
Siegel notes, not all of Scalia's statements support an absurdity requirement as part of the scrivener's
error doctrine. Instead, the obviousness of the error and of the statute's intended meaning appear to
justify the exception as he would apply it. Id. at 332.
204. See Manning, supra note 12, at 2467 ("These background conventions, if sufficiently firmly
established, may be considered part of the interpretive environment in which Congress acts."). See also
Nelson, supra note 11, at 391 ("[S]ome specialized canons help courts discern Congress's likely intent
not because they reflect careful study of what Congress does on its own, but simply because members of
Congress know that the courts use them."). Cf Easterbrook, supra note 51, at 540 ("Rules are desirable
not because legislators in fact know or use them in passing laws but because rules serve as off-the-rack
provisions that spare legislators the costs of anticipating all possible interpretive problems and
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In theory, a reasonable member of Congress would read these
conventions into a statutory text, and legislative bargains would reflect
this interpretive setting.2°5 The difficulty is that the absurdity doctrine is
potentially very broad, and unpredictable in application.
As Manning suggests, treating the absurdity doctrine as just another
interpretive convention would dramatically affect the judicial role:
If the Court applied a background convention providing that "judges shall
apply the social meaning of a statute unless they can think of a better way
of doing the same thing," that convention would in some sense be the
basis of every legislative bargain. But more accurately understood, it
would license the courts to disregard the specific bargains struck through
the legislative process and to strike new balances outside the confines of
bicameralism and presentment. Although somewhat less sweeping, the
absurdity doctrine has an analogous effect.
20 6
Thus, the absurdity doctrine seems to conflict with textualist thought. A
broad-based scrivener's error doctrine would have a similar impact.
The most basic answer from the textualist perspective is to simply do
away with the absurdity and scrivener's error doctrines. Potentially, the
benefits from having these doctrines as an option do not counterbalance
the effects of courts and litigators that read them broadly. British
judges, at times, have supported this view.20 7
The difficulty with eliminating either doctrine is the possibility that an
extreme case will arise under an otherwise unambiguous text. Such
cases may be rare, but that does not render their outcomes acceptable,
especially in instances of gross injustice. Jury nullification, pardons, or
prosecutorial discretion offer no guarantee against the emergence of the
legislating solutions for them.").
205. Cf Manning, supra note 12, at 2472 ("One might argue, of course, that the absurdity
doctrine's potential application is part of the bargain itself. But given the doctrine's open-ended and ad
hoc nature, it is difficult to sustain that position.").
206. Id.
207. Cf Siegel, supra note 12, at 325 n.73 (citing examples of British judicial statements against
the absurdity doctrine, described in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1112 (Eskridge & Frickey eds., 1994));
Fried, supra note 13, at 596 (citing British cases rejecting the scrivener's error doctrine). Although he
does not propose that courts abolish either doctrine, John Nagle has critiqued the willingness of
textualist judges to accept the absurdity and scrivener's error doctrines. See generally Nagle, supra note
12. Recently, Adrian Vermeule has also called the absurdity doctrine into question on institutional
grounds. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 58 (2006) ("[T]he crucial questions
about absurdity are institutional. First, will judges avoid more absurdity than they create, or vice versa?
Second, is judicial power to correct absurdity beneficial in net effect, given that some fraction (perhaps a
very high fraction) of genuine absurdities will be weeded out by other institutions in the legal system?").
The concerns Vermeule raises, however, are distinct from the question whether the absurdity doctrine
can be squared with textualist tenets.
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truly absurd result. 20 8  A textualism that lacked this safety valve is
unpalatable when courts are confronted with cases of true absurdity.
Furthermore, that either doctrine will fall out of favor is highly
unlikely. 20 9  Both doctrines are acceptable in some form to the
staunchest judicial defenders of textualist interpretation. If application
of these doctrines is inevitable, far better from the textualist perspective
if there is a means to explain them.
Another answer to textualism's exceptions is to apply other, less
controversial doctrines in their stead. In many cases, the use of the
absurdity doctrine is unnecessary to resolve a case, because contextual
interpretation, based upon established social usages, will preclude the
troubling application of statutory language.210 In addition, certain
established interpretive canons-e.g., the doctrine of necessity, or the
doctrine de minimis non curat lex-offer narrower alternatives to the
absurdity doctrine. 211 These canons are comparatively predictable from
the legislative viewpoint, and give courts less opportunity to rewrite
statutes on policy grounds.
212
Unfortunately, an established social usage may not be forthcoming,
and the relevant canons may be inapplicable. The benefit of these
alternative canons is also their weakness. The restricted scope of
narrower established canons means that some egregious cases will evade
208. John Nagle suggests that such outcomes are unlikely, however:
Of course a surgeon operating on a critically injured patient and a prisoner fleeing for his
life should not be subjected to severe criminal sanctions. It is difficult to imagine,
though, how that would actually happen. A federal grand jury or an elected local
prosecutor would have to agree to indict such sympathetic defendants, then a jury would
have to agree to convict them.
Nagle, supra note 12, at 10.
209. In fact, the absurdity doctrine has been a consistent interpretive feature over the years. See
Manning, supra note 12, at 2389 (noting that "the absurdity doctrine has been one of the few fixed
points in the Court's frequently shifting interpretive regimes.").
210. See id. at 2461 (contending, based on the manner in which people choose words to effect
desired ends, interpretation that accounts for contextual social usage "should eliminate the most
egregious cases of absurdity.").
211. Cf Alex Kozinski, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Revisited, 112 HARV. L. REV.
1876, 1913 (1999) (applying doctrine of necessity to avoid a literalist interpretation of a statute in a
hypothetical murder case). See also Manning, supra note 12, at 2467 (suggesting that such background
legal conventions "will often enable judges to sidestep putative absurdities without resorting to the ad
hoc strong intentionalism that defines the absurdity doctrine."). Note, however, that not all courts are
solicitous of de minimis arguments. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1118-22 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (rejecting a de minimis argument in the context of the Delaney Clause, which addressed the
regulation of food additives).
212. See Manning, supra note 12, at 2473 ("To the extent that established conventions such as the
defense of necessity or equitable tolling have developed content through common law reasoning, they
offer at least an intelligible basis for legislators and the public to identify and evaluate the legislative
bargains struck.").
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their grasp. A statute may contain an obvious drafting error, evidenced
in the legislative history, yet still be unambiguous when read literally.
The Scurto case with its allowance for "unlawful" impeachment is a
good example. A clearly drafted law might also create unanticipated
results-which all humanity would unite against-yet not fall within an
established canon.213
A third possibility, proposed by Manning, would substitute the
constitutional avoidance canon for the absurdity doctrine.214 Under this
canon, courts avoid interpretations of a statute which raise serious
constitutional questions. 215  For example, readings of a statute which
raise doubts under the rational basis test could implicate the avoidance
canon. Truly absurd statutory applications may fit into this category. In
addition, the avoidance canon applies only in cases where the statutory
language is ambiguous, thus removing the concern that courts are
ignoring a clear statutory text.
216
For these reasons, the avoidance canon is arguably less pernicious
from the textualist point of view than the absurdity doctrine.21 7 As
Nagle has pointed out, though, the avoidance canon is itself subject to
challenge. 218  Unlike a restricted reading of the absurdity doctrine, the
avoidance canon does not necessarily have a link to probable legislative
intentions. It is a judicial policy judgment that statutes should be
interpreted to avoid constitutional questions, and this judgment raises
serious separation of powers concerns. 219  And, much like a broad
absurdity doctrine, the application of the avoidance canon is hard for
213. Cf id. at 2474-76 (suggesting that this risk is justified in light of constitutional structure).
214. See Manning, supra note 12, at 2476-85 (suggesting replacement of the absurdity doctrine
with an approach that seeks to avoid serious constitutional questions under the rational basis test). Cf
Manning, supra note 20, at 118-19 (noting that the absurdity doctrine can be viewed as an application of
the practice requiring the Court "to construe statutes, where possible, to avoid substantial constitutional
questions.").
215. For an in-depth discussion of this canon and its implications, see William K. Kelley,
Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831 (2001). See
also Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945 (1997).
216. See Manning, supra note 12, at 2481-82 (noting that the avoidance canon allows courts to
avoid constitutional questions "only when there is a plausible textual interpretation that would avoid
such questions."). But cf Kelley, supra note 215, at 855 ("[T]he fact that there might be numerous 'fair'
constructions of a statute does not mean that there is not one that is best.").
217. In addition, depending upon its application, a link to rationality review may apply to only a
limited number of cases. See Manning, supra note 12, at 2482-83.
218. Nagle, supra note 12, at 3 (noting that the avoidance canon may itself be misconceived). See
also Kelley, supra note 215 (critiquing the avoidance canon); John Copeland Nagle, Delaware &
Hudson Revisited, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495 (1997) (same); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander
Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71 (same).
219. See Kelley, supra note 215, at 843 (describing concerns related to legislative supremacy, as
well as Article II values).
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Congress to anticipate beforehand.22 °
Judge Posner notes the broad impact which the canon may have:
Congress's practical ability to overrule a judicial decision misconstruing
one of its statutes ... is less today than ever before, and probably was
never very great. The practical effect of interpreting statutes to avoid
raising constitutional questions is therefore to enlarge the already vast
reach of constitutional prohibition beyond even the most extravagant
modem interpretation of the Constitution .... 221
Whether courts should replace the absurdity doctrine with the avoidance
canon is far from clear. An alternative to the absurdity doctrine that still
conflicts with textualist principles, however, does not remove the
challenge to textualism.
Ultimately, the potential alternatives to the absurdity and scrivener's
error doctrines are appealing, but inadequate. Statutes will inevitably
continue to force courts to recognize a drafting error, or to avoid an
unthinkable outcome. Both doctrines are well-established, and to the
extent the occasional extreme fact pattern arises, both will still be found
necessary. Accordingly, there is a need for a theory of these two
doctrines that is still consistent with textualism. The following Sections
offer such a theory.
IV. A TEXTUALIST THEORY FOR ABSURDITIES
This article proposes a different solution for absurd results: a clear
statutory text is not actually disregarded when the absurdity doctrine is
applied. Instead, the absurdity doctrine is triggered by those highly
unusual situations in which a presumed legislative intent is in conflict
with a "literal" application of statutory language. In those instances, the
objective meaning of the statute to a competent user of the language is
distinct from its otherwise literal meaning.
Outcomes that everyone would consider monstrous do exist, and this
informs a reader as to an author's presumed intent. Note that Chief
Justice Marshall's test for absurdity looks for results that are sufficiently
monstrous that all, without hesitation, would unite in rejecting them.
Although one should take great care in ascribing policy views to
220. Cf Kelley, supra note 215, at 866 ("[T]he avoidance canon's insistence that Congress clearly
demonstrate its desire to force a constitutional decision places the onus on Congress to foresee the nature
of the interpretive problems that will arise under a particular statute; it is clear, however, that the
legislative process cannot adequately anticipate every potential issue (constitutional or otherwise) that
might arise.").
221. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation - In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U.
CH. L. REV. 800, 816 (1983).
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legislators, certain outcomes may be so far beyond the pale that a
competent reader would assume they are not intended. Thus, to the
extent objectified intent is relevant, the door is open to judicial
recognition of absurdity as an indicator of meaning.
Reasoning along these lines is common for informal conversations,
and some intentionalist theories of statutory interpretation attempt to
transplant conversational norms into the interpretive process.222
Drawing on precepts developed by Paul Grice, this perspective looks to
how language is used, and the assumptions that a listener makes about a
speaker's meaning.223 In conversation, listeners attempt to intuit what a
speaker actually means, and the process is a cooperative endeavor.
Inasmuch as textualism is concerned with the competent reader's
perspective, these norms of interpretation are potentially relevant, albeit
constrained.
Textualists recognize the import of ordinary language use when
interpreting statutes. For example, in Johnson v. United States, Justice
Scalia suggested "the acid test of whether a word can reasonably bear a
particular meaning is whether you could use the word in that sense at a
cocktail party without having people look at you funny." 224  Readers
naturally assume certain intentions in certain contexts, and the cocktail
party test is a helpful reminder of this fact. Ignoring these aspects of
meaning is to ignore the way in which we use language.
The problem for textualists is that statutory text may not be rational,
and may even serve contradictory purposes, yet still reflect the
legislative bargain struck during the drafting process. In this respect, the
expectations appropriate to statutory language are unlike those for
conversational language.225 Many of the purposive assumptions that are
quite normal when interpreting spoken language are out of place when
interpreting a statute enacted by two chambers of Congress and signed
by the President.
222. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 WiS. L.
REV. 1179; M.B.W. Sinclair, Law and Language: The Role of Pragmatics in Statutory Interpretation, 46
U. PITT. L. REV. 373 (1985). See also Lawrence M. Solan, Learning Our Limits: The Decline of
Textualism in Statutory Cases, 1997 WiS. L. REV. 235, 253; Solan, supra note 56.
223. Cf PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 26 (1989) (describing the cooperative
principle of conversation). Grice's philosophy of language is grounded in the importance of speaker's
meaning.
224. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 718 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
225. See Hurd, supra note 56, at 990 ("[L]egislation does not appear to be best explained as
communication because the legislature lacks the intentions required of a speaker and because citizens
and officials lack the beliefs required of an audience (at least concerning the conduct rules traditionally
construed as paradigmatic commands)."). See also Manning, supra note 12, at 2462 n.274
(Conversational maxims "[do] not readily translate from the conversational setting to the complex,
multilateral bargaining process of framing a statute.").
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The Supreme Court has implicitly recognized this concern in its
application of the absurdity doctrine. In Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co.,
Inc., the Court interpreted the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act
of 1992, a statute which imposed obligations on "signatory coal
operators" and "related persons" to address benefit plans in the coal
mining industry.2 26 Signatory coal operators had signed agreements
requiring contributions to benefit plans under collective bargaining
agreements. 227 "Related persons" were entities with certain business
affiliations to a signatory coal operator.228 The issue was whether the
Commissioner of Social Security could "assign retired miners to the
successors in interest of out-of-business signatory operators," for
purposes of paying their benefit plans.229
Although the statute expressly provided for successor liability with
respect to related persons, it contained no text imposing liability on a
signatory coal operator's successor in interest.230 Strictly construed, this
meant that successors to signatory coal operators that had signed onto
the benefit plans would not be liable, but successors to related persons
would be.23'
The Commissioner of Social Security argued for the extension of
liability to the successors of signatory coal operators, and suggested that
the Court should interpret the statute this way to avoid counter-intuitive
results. 232 The Court refused to do So. 2 3 3 Despite the apparent illogic of
the statute, the Court applied the text as written. 234
As explained by the Barnhart Court:
[N]egotiations surrounding enactment of this bill tell a typical story of
legislative battle among interest groups, Congress, and the
President.... [A] change in any individual provision could have
unraveled the whole. It is quite possible that a bill that assigned liability
to successors of signatory operators would not have survived the
legislative process. The deals brokered during a Committee markup, on
the floor of the two Houses, during a joint House and Senate Conference,
or in negotiations with the President are not for us to judge or second
226. 534 U.S. 438 (2002).
227. Id. at 447.
228. Id. at451-52.
229. Id. at 442.
230. Id. at 453-54.
231. Id. at459.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 461-62.
234. Id. (concluding that "[t]his statute does not contain conflicting provisions or ambiguous
language" and refusing to "alter the text" of the statute).
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guess.
235
Thus, mere oddity of design is not enough. But in the more egregious
absurdity case, a reader can confidently determine that a particular
application falls outside the ambit of the text. This determination is not
simply an issue of imposing the reader's policy preferences: it is a
determination which follows from the conventional understanding of the
context, in light of the unthinkable consequences of the alternative. In
other words, absurdity cases are cases of obviousness.
Textualists are right to exclude many of the implied meanings and
purposes that characterize language used in conversational settings. The
pre-enactment bargaining process and complexities of legislation make
it nearly impossible to accurately assess such implicit intentions. It does
not follow that textualists must exclude every instance of implied
meaning. Even a reader who holds a deep skepticism regarding the
existence of legislative intent may recognize that certain applications of
statutory language could not have been intended by an author given the
language used.236
The language philosopher John Searle provides a useful illustration of
how extreme applications may fall outside of a statement's sentence
meaning. In an essay on literal meaning, he has argued that the truth
conditions of a sentence vary based upon background assumptions that
"have nothing to do with indexicality, change of meaning, ambiguity,
conversational implication, vagueness, or presupposition as these
notions are standardly discussed .... ,237 Background assumptions can
determine a sentence's applicability.
Searle considers the following request at a restaurant-"Give me a
hamburger, medium rare, with ketchup and mustard, but easy on the
relish., 238 He then suggests unusual readings of this request:
Suppose for example that the hamburger is brought to me encased in a
cubic yard of solid Lucite plastic so rigid that it takes a jack hammer to
bust it open, or suppose the hamburger is a mile wide and is "delivered"
to me by smashing down the wall of the restaurant and sliding the edge of
235. Id. at 461.
236. This perspective is similar in some respects to the textualist understanding of the implied
covenant of good faith in contract law. Cf Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting,
908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.) (."Good faith' is a compact reference to an
implied undertaking not to take opportunistic advantage in a way that could not have been contemplated
at the time of drafting, and which therefore was not resolved explicitly by the parties."). Judges who are
generally reluctant to look past the explicit terms of an agreement still recognize an exception to address
results which simply could not have been intended.
237. JoHN R. SEARLE, Literal Meaning, in EXPRESSION AND MEANING 117, 125 (1979).
238. Id. at 127.
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it in. Has my order.., been fulfilled or obeyed in these cases? 239
Searle concludes that the order for a hamburger has not been obeyed
in these cases. 240 More to the point, the fact that his order has not been
obeyed does not show he "failed to say exactly and literally" what he
meant.24 1  According to Searle, he should not have said "Give me a
hamburger" and added, "don't encase it in plastic and no mile wide
hamburgers, please., 242 The initial request was properly stated.
It is significant that nothing more needed to be said to state the order
properly. If qualifiers respecting egregious hamburgers were required in
order to express the hamburger order, it would be impossible to
adequately say what we mean. Searle notes that there are always
additional ways in which the background assumptions of our speech
might fail to apply to the circumstances:
First, [the background assumptions] are not fixed and definite in number
and content; we would never know when to stop in our specifications.
And second, each specification of an assumption tends to bring in other
assumptions, those that determine the a3plicability of the literal meaning
of the sentence used in the specification.
He concludes that objective meaning necessarily exists relative to
background assumptions.244
To read a text in light of the innumerable, unstated background
assumptions which are a part of a sentence's meaning is not to
improperly deviate from the literal meaning of the words, nor to abolish
the idea of objectivity. 245  There is still an objective meaning-given
certain inevitably unstated background assumptions. The significance is
239. Id. Cf JOHN R. SEARLE, THE REDISCOVERY OF THE MIND 179 (1992) [hereinafter SEARLE,
REDISCOVERY] ("If I say 'Cut the grass,' and you rush out and stab it with a knife, or I say 'Cut the
cake,' and you run over it with a lawn mower, there is a perfectly ordinary sense in which you did not do
exactly what I asked you to do.").
240. SEARLE, supra note 237, at 127.
241. Id. at 128.
242. Id. As Searle adds, "If we say that, then it will become impossible ever to say what we mean
because there will always be further possible breakdowns in our background assumptions which would
lead us to say that the obedience conditions of the sentence were not satisfied in a given context." Id.
243. Id. at 126. See also id. at 128, 131 (concluding that background assumptions cannot be
completely represented). See also SEARLE, REDISCOVERY, supra note 239, at 180.
244. SEARLE, supra note 237, at 132-33. See also SEARLE, REDISCOVERY, supra note 239, at 181
("The suggestion, surely correct, is that sentence meaning, to at least some extent, underdetermines what
the speaker says when he utters the sentence. Now, the claim I am making is: Sentence meaning
radically underdetermines the content of what is said.").
245. Searle emphasizes that his theory is not destructive of literal meaning. SEARLE, supra note
237, at 132 ("Motion, though relative, is still motion. Similarly, when I say that the literal meaning of a
sentence only has application relative to the coordinate system of our background assumptions, I am not
denying that sentences have literal meanings. Literal meaning, though relative, is still literal meaning.").
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that some applications of language, though acceptable when consulting a
dictionary definition, fall outside of a text's meaning because they
conflict with our background assumptions.
Recognizing these assumptions is hardly antithetical to textualist
analysis-the concern is how extensively to apply this insight.
24 6
Manning, for example, has recognized the potential of contextual
analysis as a substitute for the absurdity doctrine in some cases.24 7 Yet
he places a substantial limit on this possibility: "[flor textualists, the
prerequisite for employing a contextual interpretation to avoid absurdity
is the existence of a relevant and established social nuance to the usage
of the word or phrase in context., 248  The usage at issue must be pre-
existing, and settled.249
For an illustration of how established uses of language could permit
courts to avoid results without using the absurdity doctrine, recall
Pufendorf's discussion of a statute that creates criminal liability for
those who draw blood in the public square. As the phrase "drew blood"
has developed a settled social connotation, Manning suggests this could
permit a court to avoid the application of the law to a doctor. 250  People
regularly speak of drawing blood when they go to the doctor, and the
concept involves a different meaning from drawing blood at a fight.2
This established social use would arguably indicate an ambiguity
between a violent act and a medical procedure.
As noted above, contextual analysis of this sort is only a partial
solution to absurdity doctrine concerns. Established usages do not
remedy some of the worst absurdities, such as punishing the escapee
from a prison who does not wish to be burned to death. There is no
246. David Sosa has suggested that this theory may pose problems for textualists in cases of
indeterminacy, however. Sosa, supra note 82, at 931-32 (contending that the search for objective
meaning cannot resolve problems of indeterminacy, but that an inquiry into intent may do so).
247. Manning, supra note 12, at 2461 ("[B]ecause people typically try to choose words to effect
their desired ends, textual interpretation that accounts for contextual social usage, including colloquial
usage, should eliminate the most egregious cases of absurdity."). But cf Solan, supra note 56, at 460
("Manning is surely correct that a more nuanced, context-sensitive understanding of language can
reduce resort to extratextual material .... The only problem with this analysis is its denial that intent
underlies it.").
248. Manning, supra note 12, at 2462-63.
249. Id. at 2463 (noting importance of a "settled connotation" to contextual analysis). This is not
an application that addresses unambiguous statutes. Cf Siegel, supra note 12, at 334 ("It is one thing to
say that, by virtue of long usage, particular words or phrases may take on specialized meanings that are
surprising to a casual reader.... The breaking point is surely passed, however, by the suggestion that
statutory text does not mean what it means whenever what it means is absurd.").
250. Manning, supra note 12, at 2461-63 (discussing application of contextual analysis to
Pufendorf's absurdity example involving surgery in the streets).
251. Id. at 2461 ("A modem textualist, however, would place different glosses on the phrase
'drew blood' in different contexts.").
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established social nuance to the word "escape" which applies to
breaking out from prison but not where death is at issue.
Notwithstanding the gross injustice in punishing this act, the prisoner
has still escaped.
For Manning, mature legal systems address this gap.252 Over time,
interpretive doctrines arise to address situations which would otherwise
involve absurdities. Thus, an established judicial doctrine-the doctrine
of necessity-now exists to deal with scenarios like the prison escape in
case of fire. 253  The difficulty with this proposal is that it does not
address the problem of absurdities in the first instance, and the textualist
cannot add new doctrines each time a new absurdity arises. It is hard to
see how reliance solely on established social usages or pre-existing
canons will provide comfort in future, unanticipated cases.254
Instead, a competent reader should consider social conventions that
are more abstract, as evidenced by Searle's hamburger example.
Textualist judges are concerned with how a reader would understand
statutory language in context, and competent readers do take into
account obvious authorial intentions that are evident from that language.
Legislative enactment does not strip away established colloquial
meanings. It also need not strip away the most basic reader
understandings about the authors of statutes.
The competent reader familiar with the legislative process cannot
presume that a statute will be coherent from a policy perspective. The
legislative process produces statutes which do not reflect one shared
legislative policy, given the inevitable legislative compromises. A
reader can presume law does not reflect a compromise whereby sheriffs
are punished for arresting criminals within their jurisdiction, doctors
jailed for saving lives in the streets, or prisoners punished for escaping
from certain death. Presumptions about the use of language can include
252. Id. at 2468 ("Because of the abundance of such conventions in a legal system as old as ours,
textualists have at their disposal a collection of well-settled background norms for addressing many
(though certainly not all) of the problems that were once handled by the absurdity doctrine out of
necessity.").
253. Id. at 2469 ("A modem court ... might analyze the same problem in terms of the background
common law defense of necessity, against which the legislature presumably enacted the criminal statute
against escape."). See supra text accompanying note 211.
254. Jonathan Siegel notes the draw of the absurdity doctrine for textualists:
The textualists are ... between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, they need the
absurd results exception, because perverse cases prevent them from maintaining, with
perfect purity, the position that clear statutory text must always be followed. On the
other hand, by acknowledging the absurd results exception, they expose the error of the
view that the Constitution compels their theory of statutory interpretation.
Siegel, supra note 12, at 335.
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questions of gross injustice, at least at the margins.
This is not to say that such presumptions are always accurate. Given
the risk that even a seemingly monstrous result is the product of a
legislative compromise, or that judges will tend to be overexpansive in
using the absurdity doctrine, considering legislative history in such cases
is a matter of prudence.255 And Congress may always indicate with
precision that an apparently absurd result is indeed the intended one.256
In this sense, the absurdity doctrine is an interpretive default, rather than
a mandate.
Moreover, this theory requires courts to distinguish undesirable, even
highly undesirable, consequences of applying a statute, from
consequences that are unthinkable. There is nothing unthinkable in
finding that the government "utilized" the ABA in the Public Citizen
case, even if the policy result is felt to be highly undesirable. Nor is the
outcome of strict construction unthinkable in the Church of the Holy
Trinity case.257 As surprising as a strict application of the statute might
be from the perspective of the late nineteenth century, the case does not
implicate a truly absurd or monstrous result.
One of the classic absurdity cases, Riggs v. Palmer, provides an
example of the distinction. 258 Riggs involved an heir who laid claim to
the estate of his grandfather, whom he had murdered.2 5 9  The Court
255. Cf Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(suggesting it is appropriate to consult legislative history "to verify that what seems to us an unthinkable
disposition ... was indeed unthought of .. "). One might also suggest that the absurdity itself renders
an otherwise clear statute ambiguous. Cf AM Int'l, Inc. v. Graphic Mgmt. Assocs.,Inc., 44 F.3d 572,
577 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J.) ("An absurdity in the application of the plain-meaning rule usually
results from a comparison of the apparently plain meaning to the real-world setting in which the contract
or statute is to be applied. It is the same point that a clear document can be rendered unclear--even
have its apparent meaning reversed-by the way in which it connects, or fails to connect, with the
activities that it regulates."). If adopted, this theory could also support a resort to legislative history.
256. This view was expressed by William Blackstone:
[I]f the parliament will positively enact a thing to be done which is unreasonable, I know
of no power.., to control it: and the examples usually alleged in support of this sense of
the rule do none of them prove, that, where the main object of a statute is unreasonable,
the judges are at liberty to reject it.
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES *60. Cf Rhode Island Charities Trust v. Engelhard Corp.,
267 F.3d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 2001) ("True, parties can contract for preposterous terms. If contract language is
crystal clear or there is independent extrinsic evidence that something silly was actually intended, a
party may be held to its bargain, absent some specialized defense."). Conceivably such instances would
raise rationality review concerns in some cases. Cf Manning, supra note 12, at 2479-82 (describing
rationality review issues raised by some absurdities).
257. Granted, societal views about what is unthinkable may shift over time and differ among
judges. This concern about line drawing is addressed infra in Part VI of this article.
258. 22 N.E. 188 (NY 1889). For an interesting discussion of the reasoning in this case, see
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 15-20 (1986).
259. Riggs, 22 N.E. at 188-89.
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applied the absurdity doctrine to avoid giving this individual his
inheritance. 260 Riggs does not involve an unthinkable application of the
text: the murderer seeking to benefit from the statute is monstrous, but
the statute's workings as such are not. 261  As John Nagle has noted,
parents might still wish their children to receive an inheritance in this
case.
262
Chief Justice Marshall's formulation is thus quite restrictive. A
meaning which, without hesitation, "all would unite in rejecting," is one
which reflects background assumptions for effectively all users of the
language. The obvious absurdity and injustice of applying the statute in
such a case indicate that the law's terms do not cover the facts at issue.
Thus, it is not necessary to view the problem of absurdities in terms of a
judicial imposition of policy. Instead, this is an intent-based approach,
from an objective perspective. The interpreter may safely conclude that
if anyone, without hesitation, would reject the grossly absurd meaning of
the law-it could not have been intended.
Consequently, established examples of the application of language at
issue are not forthcoming because they would not have occurred to
anyone. Rather than look to whether a particular colloquial meaning is
commonly used, one looks to whether a particular meaning would ever
be used. For this reason, the absence of a relevant established social
nuance is unsurprising. For the same reason, legislators should not be
expected to evade absurdities during the drafting process.
To return to Searle's hypothetical, the mile wide hamburger is still a
hamburger. A restaurant that provides this mega-burger is nevertheless
not in compliance with the request for a hamburger, because it is
unthinkable that the person making the request had this gigantic object
in mind. Likewise, the prison escapee has escaped, but the competent
reader can determine that the law does not apply to these facts. It is
unthinkable that a legislator could have had the escapee's case in mind.
As Searle has suggested, sentence meaning must be understood in
263
relation to an indefinite number of background assumptions.
260. Id. at 189.
261. Id. at 192 (Gray, J., dissenting) (contending that policy does not demand the court avoid the
succession to the grandson, "for the demands of public policy are satisfied by the proper execution of the
laws and the punishment of the crime.").
262. Nagle, supra note 12, at 10 ("The very people whom I expect to inherit from me... are the
very people whom I would want to forgive and let them have my stuff in the hopefully remote
possibility that they were to murder me."). See also Riggs, 22 N.E. at 192 (Gray, J., dissenting) ("To
allow their argument to prevail would involve the diversion by the court of the testator's estate into the
hands of persons, whom, possibly enough, for all we know, the testator might not have chosen or desired
as its recipients.").
263. See SEARLE, supra note 237, at 128 ("And there are... two reasons why these extra
assumptions could not all be realized in the semantic structure of the sentence, first they are indefinite in
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Legislators are simply not able to resolve the absurdity problem ex ante.
It is impossible to anticipate ahead of time all of the assumptions which
might matter when a statute is applied, although they are easy enough to
discern after the fact. Given the lack of clairvoyance of human actors,
there is no way to avoid all possibility of absurd applications, no matter
how carefully a statute is drafted.264
Objectified intent is the appropriate lens here. Concurring in Public
265Citizen v. United States Department of Justice, Justice Kennedy
offered the following commentary on the absurdity doctrine:
This exception remains a legitimate tool of the Judiciary, however, only
as long as the Court acts with self-discipline by limiting the exception to
situations where the result of applying the plain language would be, in a
genuine sense, absurd, i.e., where it is quite impossible that Congress
could have intended the result, and where the alleged absurdity is so clear
as to be obvious to most anyone.
266
This formulation can be squared with textualist principles, not as a
judicial effort to follow the subjective intent that lies behind a statutory
text, but as an instance where the presumed intent is so clear that it
would influence any competent reader's understanding of what the text
means.
Legislation does not closely resemble conversation between
individual human beings-many clues as to intent are stripped away.
Accordingly, inferences that listeners make in conversation are not
readily available.267 Irrational statutory texts can also be expected given
the legislative process and the unknowable compromises which lead to
an enacted bill.268 Nevertheless, skepticism of intentionalist inquiries
should not obscure the existence of an obvious authorial meaning. The
objective meaning of a sentence can be clear based upon the likelihood
number, and second, whenever one is given a literal statement of these assumptions, the statement relies
on other assumptions for its intelligibility.").
264. Even were the application at issue an anticipated one, it is far from clear that this renders an
absurdity concern less salient. The very absurdity of a particular fact pattern may cause a reasonable
legislator to believe the statute would not cover the application before the court, and accordingly leave
the absurd scenario unaddressed.
265. 491 U.S. 440 (1989).
266. Id. at 470-71 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
267. See supra text accompanying notes 222-225. See also Manning, supra note 12, at 2462
n.274 ("In contrast with the typical conversational setting, the initial step of identifying a background
purpose at odds with a statutory text may be unintelligible or may slight the legislative process that
produced the final text."); Siegel, supra note 12, at 348 ("These differences do not prove that it is wrong
to attempt to use Grice's theories in understanding statutes, but they do defeat the argument that
textualism is a faulty method simply because it differs from the usual methods by which people
understand each other's ordinary remarks.").
268. Cf Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438 (2002).
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that almost all users of the words in this context would intend one thing
and not another.
Established social nuances are one way of locating the significance of
a text. Non-established uses can also implicate obvious meanings. For
example, a successful metaphor will involve a novel linkage between
two things. In interpreting a metaphor, the reader will recognize that the
literal meaning of the metaphor is nonsensical, or at least that it does not
seem to fit the context. In Searle's terms, the literal meaning is
"defective." 269  If the literal meaning of a sentence is sufficiently
defective, the reader will be able to recognize it as a metaphor, and
interpret the sentence figuratively.
Legislators, for obvious reasons, make little use of metaphors in the
legislation they enact. It would also be unusual to see judges locating
metaphors in a regulatory statute. To the extent a statute contained a
well-crafted metaphor, however, a competent, reasonable user of the
language would plausibly be able to recognize it without relying on
conversational cues.270
Similarly, an absurdity causes a competent user of the language to
interpret language in a way that avoids an unthinkable result. This
analysis does not entail a policy determination in the sense that the
reader's policy preferences are altering the outcome. Rather, it is a
determination that the objective meaning is different from what it would
otherwise be when the words are read literally. Indeed, the presumed
intent may be so obvious that interpretation to avoid absurdities is not
even conscious. Viewed in these terms, the absurdity doctrine is an
application of the concept of "objectified intent," and nothing more.
V. A TEXTUALIST THEORY FOR SCRIVENER'S ERRORS
In light of the above discussion, the proper treatment of scrivener's
errors should be apparent. Although scrivener's errors need not be
manifestly absurd, their existence may be equally clear from reading the
statutory text. Following the concept of objectified intent, when a
269. JoHN R. SEARLE, Metaphor, in EXPRESSION AND MEANING 76, 105 (1979) (suggesting that a
listener can tell that an utterance probably has a metaphorical meaning by adopting the strategy that
"[w]here the utterance is defective if taken literally, look for an utterance meaning that differs from
sentence meaning."). Note that, without reference to drafting history or other evidence of intent, it can
be quite easy to recognize metaphors when reading a text.
270. Justice Scalia, for example, views the references to speech and press in the First Amendment
as a synecdoche for communication more broadly. See Scalia, supra note 8, at 38 ("In this constitutional
context, speech and press, the two most common forms of communication, stand as a sort of synecdoche
for the whole."). Although this is a case of constitutional interpretation rather than statutory
interpretation, a similar principle is at work.
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drafting error is sufficiently obvious from a reasonable reading of a
statute that it could not represent what Congress intended to write, the
court should read the statute as if the error had been corrected.
Indeed, the risk of overturning a legislative bargain can be minimal.
As Manning has noted:
[O]ne could describe a narrower scrivener's error doctrine that seeks only
to identify obvious clerical or typographical errors. These errors would
be apparent from the relationship of a particular word or phrase to its
surrounding text. For example, Congress might use a cross-reference
that, in context, could refer only to a nearby section other than the one
actually named.27'
In these cases, "when an internal textual inconsistency or an obvious
error of grammar, punctuation, or English usage is apparent from
reading a word or phrase in the context of the text as a whole, there is
only the remotest possibility that any such clerical mistake reflected a
deliberate legislative compromise. 27
At times, a drafting error is so utterly obvious to any reader that the
meaning of the text would have to incorporate a revision to reflect the
author's apparent intent. One does not have to adopt a speaker's
meaning view of statutory content to conclude that a reader would take
into account the apparent intent when an error is sufficiently obvious.
Intentionalists occasionally point to a classic Far Side cartoon to
demonstrate perceived flaws in textualism.273 A plane is flying over a
desert island, and the copilot notices a marooned man who has drawn a
large sign in the sand of the beach. Unfortunately, the man never
completed his sign, which says in large letters, "Hel". Instead of
rescuing the man, the copilot states: "Wait! Wait! ... Cancel that, I
guess it says 'hell.
'
,
2 7 4
In cases like this one, the typographical error is blatant. The humor in
Gary Larson's cartoon stems from the fact that no actual plane would
ever turn away because the message said "Helf." Anyone in the plane
would read the sign to say "Help." Its drafting history would be an
271. Manning, supra note 12, at 2459 n.265.
272. Id. It should be noted that Manning does not endorse broader versions of the scrivener's
error doctrine. See id. (noting that versions of the scrivener's error doctrine that consider whether
Congress could have intended to adopt the policy the text clearly suggests raise the same concerns as the
absurdity doctrine).
273. See, e.g., Alexander & Prakash, supra note 11, at 980 n.38 (citing this cartoon as a reductio
of intention-free textualism); Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions ofAuthorities and
the Authority ofIntentions, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 357, 366
(Andrei Marmor ed., 1995) (using this cartoon as support for intentionalism). Cf Tiersma, supra note
114, at 432 (discussing a variation on the Far Side cartoon).
274. This cartoon is reprinted, and discussed, in Alexander, supra note 273, at 366.
76 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol.75
afterthought. Similarly, courts should recognize that a reasonable,
competent reader will adjust the meaning of a text where the correct
expression is obvious on the face of the document.
275
VI. LINE DRAWING PROBLEMS
What then, of interpretations that avoid "odd" results, short of
absurdity? Arguably, a reader could look at these applications of
statutory language and conclude, based upon a theory of "objectified
intent," that the language does not extend to this less-than-absurd
application. In consequence, legislative bargains would be subject to
judicial rewrite whenever a court could discern a conflict between a text
and the perceived legislative purpose of a statute. The risk that courts
will too easily find anomalous results is plausible.
As an example of the practical danger that "exceptions" pose for
textualist doctrine, consider the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Small v. United States.2 76  In Small, the applicable statute made
possession of a firearm unlawful for any person who had been
"convicted in any court" of a crime punishable by imprisonment for
27more than one year.  The petitioner, Mr. Small, was convicted under
the statute for possession of a firearm, and had previously been
convicted for attempted smuggling of firearms into Japan.278 At issue
was whether Small's prior conviction in a Japanese court counted as
being "convicted in any court.,
2 7 9
Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, concluded that "any court"
did not include foreign courts. 280 The Small Court concluded that, "even
though the word 'any' demands a broad interpretation, we must look
beyond the word itself."28' This reasoning was based on the significance
of context to word meaning, with the Court noting that "any" signifies
282different things in different situations. In determining the scope of
"any" in this setting, the Court emphasized the "commonsense notion
275. Cf. Nelson, supra note 11, at 356 ("[W]hen an appropriately informed reader would conclude
that the statutory text contains a scrivener's error, textualists can assert that someone seeking the
,objective' meaning of the text would naturally correct the error.").
276. 544 U.S. 385 (2005).
277. Id. at 387 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006)).
278. Id.
279. Id. ("Does this phrase apply only to convictions entered in any domestic court or to foreign
convictions as well?").
280. Id.
281. Id. at 388 (citation omitted).
282. Id. (noting that "[in ordinary life, a speaker who says, 'I'll see any film,' may or may not
mean to include films shown in another city.").
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that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.,
283
At the same time, Breyer rejected the idea that the Court was applying
a clear statement rule, and explained that the presumption against
extraterritorial application of a statute did not apply.284 To the contrary,
the statutory application was domestic. Instead, the Court's assumption
that Congress focuses on domestic concerns helped the Court
"determine Congress' intent where Congress likely did not consider the
matter and where other indicia of intent are in approximate balance. 285
Justice Breyer noted that some countries' criminal laws would
historically include crimes such as "Private Entrepreneurial Activity,"
conduct encouraged in the United States.286 These are hardly dangerous
activities. Additional support came from the Court's conclusion that if
the statute were read to include foreign convictions, the statute's
language "creates anomalies. 287 For example, the statute contained an
exception for "federal or state" antitrust or regulatory offenses-this
language meant the exception would not apply to cases where foreign
convictions were at issue.
288
Yet "any" is a broad term that usually means "one or some
indiscriminately of whatever kind., 289  The Small case presented no
established social nuance, such that "any" would have a different
meaning from its usual connotation. 290  There was also no applicable
interpretive canon, such as the presumption against extraterritorial
applications.29'
In dissent, Justice Thomas contended that, under the majority's
reasoning, "'any' means not what it says, but rather 'a subset of any,"'
thus distorting the plain meaning of the statute.292 In response to the
Court's suggestion that foreign convictions "somewhat less reliably
283. Id. (quoting Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993).
284. Id. at 389 ("[A]lthough the presumption against extraterritorial application does not apply
directly to this case, we believe a similar assumption is appropriate when we consider the scope of the
phrase 'convicted in any court' here."); id. at 390 ("These considerations, suggesting significant
differences between foreign and domestic convictions, do not dictate our ultimate conclusion. Nor do
they create a 'clear statement' rule, imposing upon Congress a special burden of specificity.").
285. Id. at 390.
286. Id. at 389.
287. Id. at 391.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 396 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997)
(quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 97 (1976))).
290. Cf Manning, supra note 12, at 2458-59 (describing how established social nuances might
allow a court to ignore a dictionary definition in favor of colloquial understandings of a word).
291. Cf id. at 2465-67 (describing how pre-existing canons of interpretation may become a part
of the legislative bargain).
292. Small, 544 U.S. at 395 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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identifty] dangerous individuals," Thomas suggested that a reasonable
legislator would have considered how accurate, on average, foreign
courts are at determining dangerousness and culpability. 293 In addition,
even if the statutory anomalies cited by the majority were odd, he noted
that they were not absurd.294
Notwithstanding these concerns, however, the Small majority did not
rely on the absurdity doctrine. The Court merely applied an
"assumption" about legislative intent. Cases like Small do indicate that
present day courts are willing to interpret an apparently unambiguous
statute to avoid an odd result. The risk that courts will depart from clear
texts based upon doubtful applications of the law is therefore real. But it
is far from clear that getting rid of the absurdity doctrine would restrict
judicial opinions of this type.
Arguably, the absurdity doctrine encourages courts to revise clear
statutory texts, since sufficiently anomalous results are at least
sometimes a relevant consideration in cases of unambiguous statutes.
295
On the other hand, if the absurdity doctrine were more consistently
limited to cases of monstrous or unthinkable results, this restraint might
push future courts away from an "odd results" analysis in intermediate
cases. It is uncertain whether the mere existence of the absurdity
doctrine encourages deviations from unambiguous statutory language.
A more direct challenge to textualist theory contends that no
principled distinction separates grossly 'absurd applications from merely
odd results.29 6 From this perspective, the fact that courts sometimes take
absurdity into account-regardless of how absurd the application is-
undercuts the argument against nontextual considerations when
interpreting clear statutes. This claim overstates the conceptual problem
for textualists. Some differences in kind depend upon differences in
degree, and absurdity is one of them.
The contention that the textualist "exceptions" are just a matter of
degree-thereby destroying the consistency of textualist doctrine-is
reminiscent of a puzzle known as the "Sorites Paradox., 297 The ancient
Greeks pondered the following logical problem. If you take a heap of
293. Id. at 402 (suggesting that Congress might proceed incrementally such that the majority's
examples of anomalies would be rational). Thomas also suggested that the majority's interpretation
would itself produce anomalies. Id. at 404-05.
294. Id. at 404 (discussing the significance of a lack of absurdity).
295. Cf Nagle, supra note 12, at 4 ("If judges are encouraged to apply the absurd results rule and
the scrivener's error rule, then we should not be surprised to see that judges want to depart from the
plain statutory language to honor other indications of the legislature's intent, too.").
296. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 12, at 335.
297. See Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language. Some Philosophical Issues, 82 CAL.
L. REv. 509, 517 (1994) (describing the Sorites Paradox). "Sorites" is derived from Greek for "heap".
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sand, and then remove one grain, you still have a heap. If you remove
another grain, the remainder will still constitute a heap. Grain by grain,
there is no particular grain which causes the leftover sand to cease being
a heap.298 The apparently logical conclusion is that each successive
quantity of grains is therefore a heap. Yet, when there is one grain left,
this final grain of sand is clearly not a heap of sand, suggesting that
something is wrong with the prior reasoning.299
A similar vagueness problem exists with absurdities. There is no
clear line which distinguishes the routine application of a statute from
the absurd. For that matter, there is no clear line which distinguishes
that which is merely absurd, from the absurd and monstrous. A very
absurd statutory result can seem awfully similar to a result that is just a
notch or two less egregious. Yet the concept of a gross absurdity is
accessible, despite the blurry edges.
Chief Justice Marshall's view of absurdity is stated in terms of a
viewpoint in which all would unite. That is a comprehensible test. An
inability to clearly draw the line between cases like Barnhart and cases
like Kirby is a function of vagueness, but this vagueness does not render
the concept of absurdity useless to the courts. Nor, for that matter,
should it invite courts to apply a broad-based "odd results" analysis in
cases that are not quite at the egregious level.
The distinction between extreme absurdities and mundane anomalies
is, grounded in more than prudence, or the shock value of an absurdity.
It is a reflection of the textualist concern with objective meaning. As
one moves along the continuum of statutory applications, from unlikely,
to odd, to unthinkable, a point is reached where any competent user of
the language will say that the language does not apply to these facts.
However characterized, it is this point which justifies an absurdity
exception.
Michael Moore suggests that consideration of egregiousness as one's
standard poses a problem for formalist courts because the inquiry calls
for courts to consider normative questions in deciding whether to take
absurdity into account. In his view:
The degree of absurdity, injustice, or unfairness cannot serve as some
kind of "triggering mechanism" for asking the safety valve question, for it
suggests the following possibility: a case where clear language leads to a
result sufficiently absurd that, if the court considered it, would suffice to
construe the language differently. But the court does not ask the safety
298. See id.
299. Although the paradox may not seem complex, Waldron notes that this is not an easy problem
to solve as a question of logic: "among philosophers there is no widely accepted resolution to the Sorites
Paradox." Id.
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valve question because it is not so absurd as to be "shocking." If
anything would be absurd, this would be. It would be as if a court, before
it could inquire into a party's negligence, had to find him grossly
negligent.
300
Moore's analysis is persuasive in terms of a court that finds it formally
wrong to consider anything short of egregious absurdities-but his
argument need not undermine the textualist recognition of the absurdity
doctrine.30'
Textualist courts reject the relevance, and perhaps existence, of a
legislative intent distinct from the objective statutory meaning. This
rejection does not mean that these courts cannot observe statutory
anomalies or odd results when reading statutes. It merely means that
anomalies and odd results are not of interest in themselves. A textualist
court does have to look at these aspects of the statute in order to find a
gross absurdity, unthinkable to all. The focus is not on the importance
of avoiding odd results (of whatever degree), but on the importance of
such results as indicators of an objective statutory meaning. 302
Intent skepticism justifies enforcement of clear statutory text, even
where the text's effects seem illogical. Statutory language that serves
conflicting ends may simply reflect the legislative bargaining process.
Yet, granting the insights of public choice theory, it is hard to see how
some applications of law could be intended by any legislator. A myriad
of unstated background assumptions, as discussed above, qualify literal
meaning. In cases that fall sufficiently beyond the pale, those
background assumptions delimit the objective content of a text.
As with absurdities, the scrivener's error doctrine exists along a
continuum of cases that concludes with obvious typographical errors.
At some point, an error in expression is so completely obvious that all
readers can recognize the error. In cases of sufficient obviousness, the
300. Moore, supra note 98, at 280 n.28 1.
301. This is so, unless one adopted a version of textualism that attempts to read texts without
taking into account objective indicators of intent. To the extent that modern textualism is comfortable
with determining objective intent based upon context, the consideration of absurdity is not inherently
barred. Another way of putting this is that it is acceptable to consider absurdity as evidence of an
objective meaning, even though it is not acceptable to consider absurdity as a substantive limit on
available meanings.
302. A loose analogy can be made to the business judgment rule. Courts applying this doctrine
are not to second guess a board's substantive judgments. Even terribly bad business judgments will not
support liability. However, a business decision for which no rational justification can be provided may
fall outside the business judgment rule. In such cases, it is not the substance of the business decision,
but the objective evidence of a state of mind, which is at issue. Cf Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264
(Del. 2000) (noting in the business judgment rule context that irrationality "may tend to show that the
decision is not made in good faith .... ). With the absurdity doctrine, the absurdity is important not as
a substantive flaw in the statute but because it indicates that the statutory meaning is different from what
the words would otherwise literally say.
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correct statutory content may also be clear. Thus, an individual
marooned on an island, writing "Helf" in the sand, has been
unambiguous in his textual meaning.
Prudence should nevertheless play a part in resolving these
interpretive questions. Textualists in particular are nervous about
rewriting what appears to be an unambiguous statutory text. Even if the
concept of an unthinkable absurdity or an obvious drafting error is
coherent, that does not make the vagueness concern irrelevant to
interpretation. Inevitably, judges will disagree as to how unthinkable a
particular statutory application is, or how blatant a scrivener's error.
What if judges disagree as to whether a particular case is egregious
enough?
Here, the problem of statutory indeterminacy offers a helpful analogy.
Lawrence Solan has written about the difficulties posed by what he calls
"pernicious ambiguities"-indeterminacies in language (whether
vagueness or ambiguity) where the actors involved in a dispute "all
believe a text to be clear, but assign different meanings to it."30 3  In
some cases, not only participants, but judges will also assign different
meanings to what they consider a clear statute. In Solan's view, these
disputes represent a communicative breakdown.30 4
Courts disagree about the significance of pernicious ambiguities. One
view is that, where different parties take opposing views on the clear
meaning of a statute, it indicates that at least one party is incorrect in
their interpretation.30 5  Another view suggests, where there are
reasonable contrary positions among the parties, there must be an
ambiguity. 30 6 Likewise, some judges think it irrelevant whether courts
have differed in their interpretations; other judges conclude that a
judicial split is evidence that the statutory meaning is unclear.30 7
As Solan notes, courts are right to be cautious about finding
uncertainty merely based on a dispute regarding the meaning of a
303. Lawrence M. Solan, Pernicious Ambiguity in Contracts and Statutes, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
859, 859 (2004). As Solan notes, ambiguity and vagueness are distinguishable, but for purposes of
discussion he treats both as a form of ambiguity. Id. at 860.
304. Id. at 859 ("The competing interpretations reflect a complete communicative breakdown. If
language worked so poorly in general, then it would not be possible to have a language-driven rule of
law at all.").
305. Id. at 867 (citing as an example Justice Thomas's concurrence in Bank of America National
Trust and Savings Ass'n v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, 526 U.S. 434 (1999) ("A mere
disagreement among litigants over the meaning of a statute does not prove ambiguity; it usually means
that one of the litigants is simply wrong.").
306. See Solan, supra note 303, at 867 ("Other courts come to the opposite conclusion, finding
ambiguity because of the parties' disagreement, provided that they each adopt plausible positions.").
307. See id. at 871-76.
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statute.30 8  This caution is especially appropriate in cases where the
disputants are the litigants themselves. He suggests these disputes
should be relevant when neutral parties-such as judges-are in
disagreement. 30 9  Disagreement may not be per se evidence of
ambiguity, 310 but, he concludes, courts should reject the idea "that
language upon whose meaning there is total disagreement is clear
language.
311
Assessing the merits of this argument as applied to statutory
indeterminacies is beyond the scope of this Article. 31 2  Yet Solan's
argument can be extended to the problem of absurdities and scrivener's
errors. The concept of a gross absurdity, which all would unite in
rejecting, is a vague one. What seems absurd to one person will seem
plausible to another. Likewise, the existence of a truly obvious
scrivener's error is, in some cases, a matter for debate. Passage of time
from the enactment of a statute adds to the probability of judicial error.
Because the test proposed in this article is keyed to absurdities or
errors that are so clear that they could not have been intended, a dispute
among the courts (or judges on a panel) is significant. The mere fact of
a dissenting opinion, or a circuit split, is not dispositive in assessing
statutory meaning. Nevertheless, a court that is concerned with the
acceptability of the absurdity or scrivener's error doctrines should take
into account judicial disagreement. As a matter of prudence, judicial
disagreement indicates that anomalous results are not grossly absurd, nor
the product of obvious drafting errors.
Courts may draw the line poorly in some cases. Merely anomalous
results will be called gross absurdities, and awkward statutory phrasing
will sometimes be amended as if it were a drafting error. Courts can be
expected to occasionally misperceive a legislative bargain as if it were a
mistake. A careful application of textualism's "exceptions" will
hopefully limit that risk.
308. Id. at 887 ("Courts are rightly cautious about drawing sweeping conclusions about
uncertainty merely from the fact that there is a dispute over the applicability of language in a contract or
a statute."). In Solan's view, they are nonetheless too cautious. Id.
309. Id. at 888 ("When it appears that different people-especially randomly selected judges with
less of an agenda than litigation parties-are not in accord about the interpretation of statutory or
contractual language, it should raise a red flag that there may be a failure to communicate.").
310. Id. ("Courts may be right in refusing to use these disagreements as per se evidence of
ambiguity.").
311. Id.
312. The two contexts are somewhat different. Allowing a dispute over textual meaning to assist
in finding an ambiguity may permit courts too easily to deviate from a clear text. In contrast, applying
Solan's argument to the vagueness of our conceptions of absurdity or scrivener's errors arguably makes
it less likely that a court will deviate from a clear text.
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CONCLUSION
Canons of interpretation are divisible into two basic categories:
normative canons, and descriptive canons.313 A normative canon
permits courts to interpret ambiguous statutory language in light of
policy preferences, which may or may not reflect legislative intent.
314
Such canons are controversial, though not uncommon. 31 5  A descriptive
canon is arguably less intrusive on legislative prerogatives. Descriptive
canons are presumptions which courts apply based upon their perceived
correlation to legislative intent.
316
Absent a compelling link to the apparent intent of the legislature-as
evidenced by a contextual reading of the statutory language-the
absurdity doctrine is an invitation for judicial revision of legislative
bargains. Accordingly, the absurdity doctrine should not be understood
in normative terms.3 17 Courts lack the authority to rewrite unambiguous
statutes to meet their policy preferences, or the legislature's apparent
policy preferences, no matter how desirable or enlightened the policy
313. See Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its
Lonely Eyes To You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 563 (1992) (observing these two functions for canons of
interpretation). Other divisions have been suggested. See, e.g., Vermeule, supra note 73, at 85 ("The
canons come in two broad groups: the so-called 'textual' or 'linguistic' canons, which are default rules
that govern questions of grammar and syntax, and the 'substantive' canons, which are default rules that
implement substantive interpretive, institutional, and distributive policies."). Ross's dichotomy may be
more useful in this context. See Nelson, supra note 11, at 394 n.140 (noting that "many 'substantive'
canons... help interpreters discern likely legislative intent, and hence can be seen as 'descriptive' rather
than 'normative."').
314. See Ross, supra note 313, at 563 ("[N]ormative canons are principles, created in the federal
system exclusively by judges, that do not purport to describe accurately what Congress actually intended
or what the words of a statute mean, but rather direct courts to construe any ambiguity in a particular
way in order to further some policy objective.").
315. A good example of a normative canon, discussed supra notes 215-220, is the canon of
constitutional avoidance. This canon stems as much from judicial policy as from any insights it might
give into legislative intent.
316. See Ross, supra note 313, at 563 ("Descriptive canons are principles that involve predictions
as to what the legislature must have meant, or probably meant, by employing particular statutory
language.").
317. Judge Easterbrook has recently critiqued a substantive understanding of the absurdity
doctrine:
Today the anti-absurdity canon is linguistic rather than substantive. It deals with texts
that don't scan as written and thus need repair work, rather than statutes that seem poor
fits for the task at hand. In other words, the modem decisions draw a line between poor
exposition and benighted substantive choice; the latter is left alone, because what judges
deem a "correction" or "fix" is from another perspective a deliberate interference with the
legislative power to choose what makes for a good rule.
Jaskolski v. Daniels, 427 F.3d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 2005). See also United States v. Logan, 453 F.3d 804,
806 (7th Cir. 2006) ("The statute is not absurd as written. Its text parses; there is no linguistic garble.").
This article does propose that substance matters, but only in those cases where the substantive absurdity
is so great that it has import for an objective meaning.
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may be.
Instead, in egregious cases, the absurdity doctrine should function like
a descriptive canon. Sufficiently monstrous results-results which all
would unite in rejecting-are not compatible with the presumed intent of
the legislature. Even for textualists, an author's presumed intent is part
of our understanding of a statute. The objective meaning understood by
a competent user of the language can exclude a sufficiently outrageous
application of the law.
This means that a judicial interpretation which relies on the absurdity
doctrine may still be faithful to the law's command. It is an outlying
instance of the contextual interpretation of language. Due to the
vicissitudes of legislative bargaining, courts cannot safely qualify clear
statutory language to take into account contrary or limiting legislative
purposes. Legislative intent, assuming it exists, is often unverifiable by
courts. Courts can, however, note instances where an application of the
law is so far beyond the pale that it could not, under any scenario, be the
product of a legislative compromise.
The scrivener's error doctrine can be formulated in similar terms.
Clerical errors, misspellings, cross-references to the wrong section of a
statute, can be so obvious that no competent reader would take them at
face value. They do not pass the interpretive laugh test. Avoidance of
gibberish, and in some cases bizarre outcomes, permits a court to fix a
clear mistake of expression.
Should the absurdity doctrine, or the scrivener's error doctrine, be
applied in less than obvious circumstances, their textualist justification
falls away. It is the certainty of an unintended result which colors the
objective meaning of a statute. For purposes of a coherent textualist
philosophy, the only acceptable cases are at the true extremes, where it
is impossible the text was intended to mean what it otherwise appears to
say.31
8
So understood, neither the absurdity doctrine nor the scrivener's error
doctrine is an exception to textualism. They simply provide additional
318 It may be argued that I am proposing a form of purposivism, where the meaning of a statute
is found in the perceived purpose of a hypothetical legislator. Perhaps this is accurate, but only to the
extent that the apparent purpose of a statute can, in some cases, lead competent readers to conclude that
the objective meaning of statutory language excludes a particular application as a matter of context.
Insofar as an objectified "purpose" can affect the ordinary understanding of language, then such
elements should be incorporated into textualism. Cf. Manning, supra note 89, at 78 ("[B]ecause
textualists understand that speakers use language purposively, they recognize that evidence of purpose
(if derived from sources other than legislative history) may also form an appropriate ingredient of the
context used to define the text."). On the other hand, a mere conflict between apparent statutory
purposes and sentence meaning is not sufficient to justify rewriting statutory content to make it more
coherent. For recent perspectives on the role of statutory purposes in textualist thought, compare id.,
with Abner S. Greene, The Missing Step of Textualism, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 1913 (2006).
2006] ABSURD RESULTS & SCRIVENER 'S ERRORS 85
evidence that textualism diverges from literalism. Textualism's
purported exceptions fit nicely with the idea that courts "do not inquire
what the legislature meant," but "ask only what the statute means."
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